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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT-A POST­
SABLE LOOK AT INDECENT SPEECH ON THE AIRWAVES AND OVER 
THE TELEPHONE LINES 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, Congress has attempted, with some difficulty, to 
regulate "indecent" speech disseminated through broadcast and re­
corded telephone messages. The telephone messages with which Con­
gress has been concerned are generically referred to as "dial-a-porn."l 
Unlike obscene speech which receives no First Amendment protec­
tion,2 and which, therefore can be regulated with impunity, indecent 
speech receives some First Amendment protection. The United States 
Supreme Court has specifically held that the First Amendment pro­
vides some protection for indecent dial-a-porn messages3 and indecent 
radio and television broadcasts.4 Thus, Congress has experienced 
some difficulty in attempting to regulate the dissemination of indecent 
broadcasts and telephone messages without imposing upon individu­
als' First Amendment rights. . 
This Note addresses the issue of whether recent regulations im­
posed by Congress and the FCC on the dial-a-porn and broadcast in­
1. See Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 118 (1989). 
2. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,24 (1973). The Miller test sets forth three crite­
ria for determining whether or not material is obscene: 
(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' 
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) 
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct 
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as 
a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 
Id. at 24 (citations omitted). 
For a further discussion of the evolution of the constitutional standard for obscenity 
and the obscene/indecent distinction see Jeffrey L. Reed, Recent Developments, First 
Amendment Protected for Indecent Speech-Dial-A-Porn, 57 TENN. L. REV. 339, 339-57 
(1990), and George Koroghlian, Note, Indecent Speech Relating to Commercial Telephone 
Messages Is Constitutionally Protected While Obscene Speech Is Not-Sable Communica­
tions of California v. Federal Communications Commission, 20 SETON HALL L. REV. 547, 
550-56 (1990). 
3. Sable, 492 U.S. at 126 (holding that "[s]exual expression which is indecent but not 
obscene is protected by the First Amendment"); see also Carlin Communications, Inc. v. 
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 827 F.2d 1291, 1296 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that "[t]he 
First Amendment does not permit a flat-out ban of indecent as opposed to obscene 
speech"), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1029 (1988). 
4. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,743 (1978). 
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dustries comport with the First Amendment in light of the 
constitutional standard set forth in Sable Communications, Inc. v. 
FCC.s The Sable decision requires that the Government use the "least 
restrictive means" when it regulates indecent speech within the dial-a­
porn medium to further the compelling interest of protecting children 
from gaining exposure to these messages.6 The Sable test has recently 
been applied by two federal courts of appeals in reviewing dial-a-porn 
regulations7 and by another federal court of appeals in reviewing a 
challenge directed at Congress' twenty-four hour ban on indecent ra­
dio and television broadcasts. 8 
The language of Sable indicates that lower courts should apply a 
strict scrutiny standard of review9 to the regulation of indecent tele­
phone messages. However, the two federal courts of appeals in the 
dial-a-porn cases upheld a regulatory scheme that was not the least 
restrictive means of regulating the speech and effectively applied a 
lower level of scrutiny to achieve this result.1O On the other hand, the 
federal court of appeals that reviewed the regulation aimed at banning 
indecent broadcasts applied a strict scrutiny standard, and held that a 
total ban was not the least restrictive means. 11 
Section I of this Note discusses the distinction that the United 
States Supreme Court has drawn between indecent and obscene 
speech. This section also traces the legislative attempts at regulating 
indecent speech within both the broadcast and dial-a-porn mediums 
and examines the responses of the Supreme Court and other federal 
courts to these regulations. 
Section II reviews three recent post-Sable federal courts of ap­
peals cases that assess the constitutionality of the most recent attempts 
S. 492 U.S. 115 (1989). 
6. Id. at 126. When the Court requires the "least restrictive means" be chosen to 
further a compelling interest, such language connotes a strict scrutiny standard. See Ward 
v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 n.6 (1989). 
7. Dial Info. Servs. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 938 F.2d 1535 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 
112 S. Ct. 966 (1992); Information Providers' Coalition for Defense of the First Amend­
ment V. FCC, 928 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1991). 
8. Action for Children's Television V. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("Act 
II"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1281-82 (1992). 
9. The Court in Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989), 
stated, "[s]exual expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First 
Amendment .... The Government may, however, regulate the content of constitutionally 
protected speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive 
means to further the articulated interest." Id. (emphasis added); see also supra note 6. 
10. Dial Info. Servs. Corp., 938 F.2d at 1541-43 (2d Cir. 1991); Information Provid­
ers' Coalition, 928 F.2d at 879 (9th Cir. 1991). 
11. Act II, 932 F.2d at 1509. 
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to regulate indecent material in both the broadcast and dial-a-porn 
mediums. This section focuses on the issue of whether the regulations 
imposed by Congress and the FCC are the least restrictive means to 
achieve the Government's compelling goal of protecting children from 
exposure to indecent speech. 
Section III analyzes the three federal courts of appeals decisions, 
specifically focusing on the application of the Sable standard in each 
case. This Note addresses the issue of whether a strict scrutiny stan­
dard was the standard of review the United States Supreme Court in­
tended to apply to the regulation of indecent speech in both the dial-a­
porn and broadcast mediums and argues that the Sable test was incor­
rectly applied by the courts in the dial-a-porn cases,12 and should not 
have been applied by the court in the broadcast case. \3 This Note 
further maintains that a proper application of the Sable test articu­
lated as a strict scrutiny standard would have yielded a more speech­
protective result in the two dial-a-porn cases. Finally, this Note sug­
gests that Supreme Court precedent dictates that Congress' recent at­
tempts to regulate the dissemination of indecent speech through the 
broadcast and dial-a-porn mediums violate the First Amendment. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Indecent vs. Obscene Speech 
The recognition of the category of "indecent speech" is a recent 
development in First Amendment law. Although obscene speech is a 
category of speech that is not protected by the First Amendment,14 the 
First Amendment does provide protection for sexually explicit non­
obscene speech. IS Congress has used the word "indecent" in its regu­
12. Dial Info. Servs. Corp., 938 F.2d at 1541; Information Providers' Coalition, 928 
F.2d at 872. 
13. Act II, 932 F.2d at 1508-09. 
14. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
IS. See Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986). Renton involved 
zoning ordinances aimed at controlling whether a movie theater could show sexually ex­
plicit adult movies depending upon its location. Id. at 43-44. The ordinances in Renton 
were challenged on the grounds that they violated the First Amendment because they were 
content-based regulations aimed at the suppression of protected speech and could not pass 
strict scrutiny. Id. at 47-48. The Court in Renton followed its earlier decision in Young v. 
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976), and held in Renton that sexually ex­
plicit non-obscene speech of this nature is protected under the First Amendment. Renton, 
475 U.S. at 46. However, the Court held that the ordinances were not content-based. Id. 
at 47. Rather, the Court found that the regulations were content-neutral. Id. at 47-50. It 
concluded that the Government was not concerned with the content of the films, but rather 
the secondary effects (i.e., prostitution, drugs, etc.) that a cluster of adult theaters might 
have on the surrounding community. Id. The Court found that because these ordinances 
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latory statutes as a separate category of language distinct from obscen­
ity, the former being a category of protected speech.16 
In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation ,17 the Court responded to an ap­
peal by the FCC in which it claimed to have the power under title 18 
section 1464 of the United States Code to regulate indecent language 
disseminated through the broadcast airwaves. While the FCC did not 
impose sanctions on the Pacifica Foundation for an afternoon broad­
cast of an allegedly indecent monologue,I8 the FCC found that the 
broadcast was indecent. 19 The Pacifica Foundation argued that the 
FCC could not regulate the airing of indecent broadcasts because inde­
cent speech, unlike obscene speech, is protected by the First 
Amendment.20 
The Court found that indecent speech has been distinguished 
from obscene speech based on the former's lack of prurient appeal.21 
The Court recognized that while prurient appeal is an element of ob­
were unrelated to the suppression of free expression, they were correctly characterized as 
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions to be reviewed under an intermediate scru­
tiny test. Id. at 46-47. The Court then found that the regulations passed intermediate 
scrutiny. Id. at 50-54. Additionally, in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 
217-18 (1975), the Court held that an ordinance forbidding a drive-in theater, visible to 
passersby, from airing movies containing nudity violated the First Amendment. 
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1988). This statute reads as follows: "Whoever utters any 
obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined not 
more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both." Id. 
Government control of broadcast content began with the Radio Act of 1927 which 
gave Congress control of the airwaves. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169,44 Stat. 1162. 
17. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). See Reed, supra note 2, at 341 for a further discussion of 
the Pacifica case. 
18. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 730. A man was driving in the car with his son when the 
broadcast of George Carlin's monologue "Filthy Words" came on the radio. Angry that 
his son was exposed to this language, he filed a complaint with the FCC. Id.; see also infra 
notes 21, 32, 39 and accompanying text. 
19. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 741-42. 
20. Id. at 742-47. 
21. Id. at 739-41. Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary defines prurient 
as "inclined or disposed to lewdness or lascivious thoughts ... having lustful ideas or 
desires." WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1451 (2d ed. 1983). 
Pacifica argued that indecent speech is different from obscene speech based on the 
former's lack of prurient appeal in an attempt to make it as difficult to characterize lan­
guage as indecent as it is to characterize it as obscene. Under the Court's analysis, if 
prurient appeal was an essential element for language to be indecent, the "Filthy Words" 
monologue would not have been indecent or obscene because it did not appeal to the pruri­
ent interest. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 739-41. Rather, George Carlin's monologue merely 
listed "filthy" words and phrases throughout the broadcast. Id. at 751-55. Thus, if the 
Court agreed with Pacifica's interpretation, a radio station could not be sanctioned for the 
airing of such a broadcast because it would not be indecent or obscene within the meaning 
of 18 U.S.c. § 1464. 
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scene speech, it is not a characteristic of indecent speech,22 which has 
been associated more with "nonconformance with the accepted stan­
dards of morality."23 
In Pacifica, the Court held that indecent speech is entitled to con­
stitutional protection.24 Nevertheless, the Court concluded that such 
speech may be regulated to serve the compelling state interest of pro­
tecting children from exposure to indecent material. 2S According to 
the Court, it has long been recognized that there is a compelling state 
interest in protecting minors from offensive expressions of speech in an 
attempt to provide for their physical and psychological well-being.26 
22. Before Pacifica, the Court, in Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 112-13 
(1974), construed the tenn "indecent" as used in 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (the regulation forbid­
ding the mailing of obscene materials) to be a synonym for obscene, as opposed to taking on 
a separate and distinct definition as it did in Pacifica. Section 1461, in relevant part, 
forbids the mailing of "obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, or vile" material. The statute 
at issue in Pacifica, 18 U.S.c. § 1464, contained similar language to § 1461, the provision at 
issue in Hamling. However, the Pacifica Court distinguished Hamling's interpretation of 
§ 1461 from § 1464. The Court reasoned that the two statutes should be interpreted differ­
ently because one deals with printed materials sent through the mail and the other regulates 
the content of public broadcast, two areas that the Court has historically afforded different 
treatment. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 741-42 & n.l7. The Court found that because of the 
differences between the two mediums, one involving mail sent between individuals and one 
being more invasive, reaching many people at one time in the broadcast audience, Congress 
could not have intended to treat the regulation of the dissemination of offensive materials 
the same in each medium. Id. 
The Court therefore concluded that the words "obscene, indecent, and profane" were 
to be read in the disjunctive, each having its own meaning. Id. at 739-40. This interpreta­
tion allowed the Court to dispose of the argument presented by PaCifica Foundation that 
"prurient appeal" is an essential component of indecent speech as is true for language to be 
characterized as obscene. See also Jay A. Gayoso, Comment, The FCC's Regulation 0/ 
Broadcast Indecency: A Broadened Approach/or Removing Immorality from the Airwaves, 
43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 871, 887 (1989). 
23. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 740; see also Reed, supra note 2, at 355. 
24. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 743, 748-49. 
25. Id. 
26. The courts have relied upon this compelling interest in detennining that Con­
gress and the FCC may regulate indecent speech disseminated through the broadcast me­
dium as well as through interstate telephone communications. Sable Communications, 
Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989); Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748. Thus, Congress and the 
FCC have attempted to develop a regulatory scheme that would serve the compelling state 
interest of protecting children from gaining access to indecent speech while passing consti­
tutional muster under the First Amendment by not infringing on adults' rights to hear 
indecent speech. The Court has been concerned that laws be sufficiently tailored so that 
adults will not be denied their free speech rights by limiting them to reading or hearing 
only those materials that are acceptable for children. Sable, 492 U.S. at 126-27 (citing 
Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383-84 (1957». 
For cases discussing the proposition that hann to children is a compelling government 
interest see New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 
422 U.S. 205 (1975); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Prince v. Massachusetts, 
321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
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B. The Evolution of the Definition of "Indecent" Speech 
1. Pacifica and the Broadcast Definition of Indecency 
The Pacifica case marks the only time the Supreme Court has 
addressed the issue of indecent broadcasts. However, in several cases 
before Pacifica, the FCC dealt with indecent broadcasts, in one case 
charging a station with violating title 18 section 1464 of the United 
States Code.27 In that case, during a radio broadcast interview, Jerry 
Garcia, a member of the rock band the Grateful Dead, used the words 
"shit" and "fuck" in a repetitive manner.28 The FCC fined the radio 
station one-hundred dollars.29 This case set forth the first definition of 
indecency in broadcast as material that "is patently offensive by con­
temporary community standards" and without "redeeming social 
value."30 
The FCC indecency standard upheld in Pacifica defined indecent 
broadcasts as those broadcasts that were "intimately connected with 
the exposure of children to language that describes, in terms patently 
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the 
broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities" aired when children 
were likely to be in the audience.31 The Pacifica Court then upheld 
the FCC's conclusion that the repetitive and deliberate use of the 
"Seven Dirty Words" as used in George Carlin's "Filthy Words" 
monologue32 was indecent speech under this definition. Thus, the 
presence of the "Seven Dirty Words" in a broadcast became a key 
element in determining whether the broadcast was indecent. 
In an effort to avoid airing potentially indecent broadcasts at a 
time when children may be in the audience, the FCC attempted to 
channel the airing of such broadcasts to the late evening hours. The 
FCC's channeling efforts were largely based on the law of nuisance. In 
27. In re WUHY-(FM), E. Educ. Radio, 24 F.C.C.2d 408,412 (1970). For a more 
thorough discussion of FCC indecency cases before Pacifica, see Gayoso, supra note 22, at 
891-92 n.138. For FCC cases post-Pacifica see Gayoso, supra note 22, at 896. 
28. Eastern Educ. Radio, 24 F.C.C.2d at 412. 
29. Id. at 415. 
30. Id. at 4\0. 
31. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 732 (1978); see also In re Citizens Com­
plaint Against Pacifica Found. Station WBAI (FM), 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 98 (1975) ("[T]he 
concept of 'indecent' is intimately connected with the exposure of children to language that 
describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards 
for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs, at times of the day 
when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience. "). 
32. In re Citizens Complaint Against Pacifica Found. Station WBAI (FM), 56 
F.C.C.2d 94 (1975). The Seven Dirty Words were; "shit," "fuck," "piss," "cunt," "cock­
sucker," "motherfucker," and "tits." Id. at 95. For the complete text of George Carlin's 
"Filthy Words" monologue, see Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 751-56. 
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certain contexts, the law of nuisance does not necessarily seek to pro­
hibit an activity, but rather to regulate or control it by limiting it to 
certain times of the day or night in an effort to accommodate those 
who wish to engage in the activity, as well as those who are inconve­
nienced or disturbed by it.33 Similarly, the FCC's goal was not to pro­
hibit indecent broadcasts, but rather to "channel [them] to times of 
day when children most likely would not be exposed to [them]."34 
Thus, after Pacifica, the FCC concluded that indecent broadcasts 
could likely be aired in the late evening hours when children are prob­
ably not in the audience, as long as the program was accompanied by a 
waming.3s 
2. Post-Pacifica: The Generic Definition of Indecency 
In April 1987, the FCC issued a public notice announcing a ge­
neric definition of broadcast indecency. 36 Previously, as part of its rul­
ings in three broadcast cases,37 the FCC had concluded that speech 
that is indecent must involve more than only the use of the "Seven 
Dirty Words." The FCC decided that the "Seven Dirty Words" inde­
cency test provided a "very limited approach to enforcing the prohibi­
tion against indecent broadcasts."38 Up to this point, the widespread 
view among broadcasters was that they could only be punished for 
indecent programming if it was very similar to George Carlin's mono­
logue and was aired before 10:00 p.m.39 
The generic standard announced by the FCC in the April 1987 
public notice defined indecency as "language or material that depicts 
or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary 
community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory 
activities or organs."40 In adopting this new test, the FCC recognized 
that the new generic test would be a more difficult approach than the 
33. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 731-33. 
34. Id. at 733. 
35. In re Infinity Broadcasting Corp., 3 F.C.C.R. 930 (1987) (citing In re Citizens 
Complaint Against Pacifica Foundation Station WBAI (FM), 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 100 (1975». 
36. Public Notice, New Indecency Enforcement Standards to Be Applied to All 
Broadcast and Amateur Radio Licensees, 2 F.C.C.R. 2726 (1987). 
37. In re Infinity Broadcasting Corp., 3 F.C.C.R. 930 (1987). There were two other 
broadcast cases reviewed with this case that involved complaints against Pacifica Founda­
tion and Regents of University of California. While all three broadcasts by the FCC in 
these cases were found to be indecent, no sanctions were imposed upon any of these broad­
cast licensees. Rather, the FCC considered these rulings to be warnings to all licensees of 
what material would be considered indecent. Id. at 934. 
38. Infinity Broadcasting Corp., 3 F.C.C.R. at 930. 
39. Id. 
40. Public Notice, 2 F.C.C.R. at 2726. 
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"Seven Dirty Words" test because the FCC and broadcasters could no 
longer make determinations of indecency based on specific words.41 
However, the FCC continued its reliance on the nuisance theory, 
concluding that broadcasts falling within the new definition of inde­
cency would only be actionable at a time of day when there was "a 
reasonable risk that children may be in the audience."42 The FCC 
concluded that this approach not only served the compelling Govern­
mental interest in protecting children from indecent material, but also 
accommodated the interests of parents who might want their children 
to see or hear such broadcasts, broadcasters who want to air indecent 
material, and adults who would like to be able to listen to indecent, 
but non-obscene airings.43 Finally, in October 1988, Congress passed 
legislation directing the FCC to enforce a twenty-four hour ban on 
indecent broadcasts.44 
41. Infinity Broadcasting, 3 F.C.C.R. at 930. 
42. Id. The FCC found that there was evidence that significant numbers of children 
were still in the audience at 10:00 p.m. Id. at 930-31. 
Subsequently, in December of 1987, the Commission issued a memorandum opinion 
and order in response to requests by several parties to clarify various aspects of its April 
1987 rulings. In that opinion the FCC upheld the April 1987 rulings. Id. at 930. How­
ever, it was persuaded by the petitioners' argument that some specific hour must be estab­
lished after which indecent broadcasts could safely be aired. Id. at 931. Accordingly, the 
Commission determined that 12:00 midnight was its "current thinking" as to when it was 
reasonable to expect that the number of children in the audience was minimized and paren­
tal supervision over children that remained in the viewing and listening audience was more 
likely. Id. at 937-38 n.47. 
43. Id. at 937-38 n.47. In her concurring opinion, Commissioner Patricia Diaz 
Dennis posed the question of whether choosing 12:00 midnight over some earlier time 
(10:00 or 11:00 p.m.) was a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction or whether it 
was, in fact, reducing adult programming to a level fit only for children in contravention of 
the holding in Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957). Id. at 938. She pointed to 
the fact that the Commission did not set forth any statistics, studies, or other specific infor­
matiori to support its conclusion that 12:00 midnight, as opposed to 10:00 or 11:00 p.m., 
was the appropriate time after which indecent material may be aired. Id. She argued that 
the Commission only stated in dicta that its "current thinking" was that 12:00 midnight is 
appropriate "based upon information currently available to the Commission," without ever 
clarifying what information it currently had. Id. at 938-39; see also Action for Children's 
Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332, 1343 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("Act I") (rejecting the 
suggestion made in the FCC's 1987 Order that time channeling can be viewed as a valid 
time, place, and manner restriction). The court in Act I suggested that because time chan­
neling is a content-based regulation of speech, it should be reviewed under strict scrutiny. 
Act I, 852 F.2d at 1343 n.18. 
44. Department of Commerce, Justice and State, The Judiciary and Related Agen­
cies Appropriation Act, 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-459, § 608, 102 Stat. 2228 (1988). See infra 
notes 114-17 and accompanying text for a more thorough discussion of the twenty-four 
hour ban imposed on indecent broadcasts. 
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C. 	 The Dial-A-Pom Industry: Congress' Attempt to Regulate 
Indecent Telephone Messages 
The dial-a-pom industry emerged in 1983 and has been a tremen­
dous financial success since its inception.45 Dial-a-pom is the generic 
name given to recorded telephone messages which offer the listener a 
form of sexually explicit entertainment for a fee.46 There have been 
several attempts to regulate this industry so as to protect minors from 
gaining access to these types of salacious messages. 
1. 	 Early Regulation of Dial-A-Pom 
In response to the widespread opposition against the dial-a-pom 
industry, Congress began its first attempt to regulate dial-a-pom.47 In 
1983, Congress amended the Communications Act of 1934 to apply to 
dial-a-pom providers.48 This amendment made it a crime to commu­
nicate directly, or by recording, any obscene or indecent message for 
commercial purposes to anyone under eighteen years of age.49 Under 
this provision, a provider of obscene or indecent messages had a de­
fense to prosecution if the provider restricted minors' access to its 
messages in accordance with FCC procedures.50 The FCC then re­
sponded to the amendment by promUlgating regulations that would 
function as "safe harbor defenses" for dial-a-pom providers.sl Under 
this scheme, a provider was not criminally liable if it restricted access 
to indecent communication by either operating only between the hours 
of 9:00 p.m. and 8:00 a.m. or requiring payment by credit card before 
transmission of the messages. S2 The first restriction was intended to 
apply to recorded dial-a-pom messages, whereas the latter was In­
tended to regulate sexually explicit live telephone messages. S3 
45. Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 120 n.3 (1989) (citing Carlin 
Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 787 F.2d 846, 848 (2d Cir. 1986) ("Carlin II")). 
46. Sable, 492 U.S. at 118 n.1. (citing Elizabeth J. Mann, Comment, Telephone. Sex, 
and the First Amendment, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1221, 1223 (1986)). For further discussion 
and statistics on number of calls to dial-a-pom see Cindy L. Petersen, Note, The Congres­
sional Response to The Supreme Coun's Treatment ofDial-a-Porn, 78 GEO. L.J. 2025,2026 
(1990). 
47. Federal Communication Commission Authorization Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 
98-214, § 8 (a), 97 Stat. 1469, 1469-70 (current version at 47 U.S.c. § 223 (Supp. II 1990)). 
48. 	 Id. 
49. [d. 

SO. Id. §§ 8(a)(3), 223(b)(2). 

5I. Enforcement of Prohibition Against the Use of Common Carriers for the Trans­

mission ofIndecent Material, 49 Fed. Reg. 24,996, 25,001-03 (1984) (to be codified at 47 
C.F.R. § 64.201). 
52. 	 Id. 
53. 	 Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 749 F.2d 113, 117-19 (2d Cir. 1984) 
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2. The Carlin Trilogy 
In three cases, Carlin Communications, Inc., at the time one of 
the largest and most lucrative dial-a-porn providers,54 petitioned the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to review various statutes and 
regulations enacted by Congress and the FCC aimed at controlling the 
dissemination of indecent dial-a-porn messages. 55 In the Carlin tril­
ogy, the Second Circuit set forth a constitutional standard by which 
dial-a-porn regulations should be reviewed. 56 The standard was first 
set forth in Carlin 1 57 and was later upheld in Carlin 11 58 and Carlin 
111.59 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the argument that 
an intermediate level of scrutiny should be applied when reviewing 
dial-a-porn regulations. It concluded that the regulations could not be 
reviewed under the intermediate scrutiny test applied to reasonable 
time, place, and manner restrictions60 because that test may only be 
applied when the government regulation is content-neutral, specifi­
cally, when the Government's reasons for regulating the speech are 
("Carlin I"). Restrictions placed on live dial-a-porn messages have not been an issue since 
the Carlin I decision, when the Second Circuit upheld the FCC's regulation which required 
an individual to pay by credit card to hear these messages. Id. The Carlin I court noted 
that the payment by credit card requirement for live dial-a-porn providers would not work 
with recorded dial-a-porn messages because recorded messages presumably do not have a 
live operator available to take credit card numbers. Id. The court agreed with the FCC's 
reasoning that children were likely to be deterred from gaining access to the live message 
because children under 18 years of age would not be issued credit cards. Id. at 117. 
54. Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 787 F.2d 846, 848 (2d Cir. 1986) ("Carlin 
II"). Carlin Communications received two cents for each call, local or long distance, and 
the remainder went to the telephone companies. 
55. Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 837 F.2d 546 (2d Cir.) ("Carlin III"), cert. 
denied, 488 U.S. 924 (1988); Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 787 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 
1986) ("Carlin II"); Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 749 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1984) 
("Carlin I"). 
56. Carlin I, 749 F.2d at 121. 
57. Id. 
58. Carlin II, 787 F.2d at 855. 
59. Carlin III, 837 F.2d at 555. 
60. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790, 798-802 (\989), for a 
discussion of reasonable time, place, manner restrictions. See also Armando O. Bonilla, 
Note, Municipal Noise Ordinance Imposing Mandatory Adherence to Sound Amplification 
Guidelines Constitutes a Valid Time, Place, or Manner Restriction on Protected Speech­
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989), 1 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 451 
(1991); Michael R. Manley, Note, Ward v. Rock Against Racism: How Time. Place and 
Manner Further Restrict the Public Forum, \ FORDHAM ENT. MEDIA & INTELL. PROP. 
L.F. 151 (1991); Carney R. Shegerian, A Sign of the Times: The United States Supreme 
Court Effectively Abolishes the Narrowly Tailored Requirement for Time, Place and Manner 
Restrictions, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 453 (1992). 
1993] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-1ST AMENDMENT-A POST-SABLE LOOK 357 

unrelated to the content of the speech.61 Here, the court found that 
the regulations were content-based restrictions. The court maintained 
that the restrictions directed at regulating dial-a-porn were content­
based because they did not apply to all "dial-it" services, but only 
those delivering indecent messages.62 Therefore, the court concluded, 
a strict scrutiny standard of review was warranted. Under strict scru­
tiny review, the Government regulation can only be upheld if it is the 
"least restrictive means" to further a compelling goal such as the Gov­
ernment interest in protecting children. 63 
a. Carlin I 
Arguing that the new regulatory scheme violated the First 
Amendment, Carlin Communications, Inc. challenged the first set of 
FCC regulations in Carlin I. The Carlin I court rejected time chan­
neling as a constitutionally acceptable means of regUlating dial-a­
porn.64 The court opined that time channeling did not further the 
Government's compelling interest because the regulations denied 
adults access to the service during certain hours, but the opportunity 
remained open for children to call these numbers during the hours in 
which access was available.6s 
Additionally, the court found that time channeling was not the 
least restrictive means available and instructed the FCC to explore 
other options such as blocking and access codes.66 The court directed 
the FCC to examine these alternatives even though it agreed with the 
FCC that these alternatives might be technically and financially bur­
densome.67 The court reasoned that such methods would avoid deny­
ing access to dial-a-porn for adults and would better serve the 
government's interest in preventing children from gaining access to 
61. Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 749 F.2d 113, 120-21 (2d Cir. 1984) 
("Carlin I"). 
62. Id. at 121; Carlin II, 787 F.2d at 85; Carlin III, 837 F.2d at 555. 
63. Carlin 1,749 F.2d at 121; Carlin II, 787 F.2d at 855; Carlin III, 837 F.2d at 555. 
64. Carlin I, 749 F.2d at 123. 
65. Id. at 121. 
66. Id. at 122-23. Under a system of voluntary blocking, an individual can contact 
the telephone company and request that their household telephones have access blocked to 
all numbers with a certain three digit prefix, the same one which has been assigned by the 
telephone company to dial-a-porn providers. See infra notes 151-71 and accompanying 
text for a further discussion of blocking mechanisms. Under the access code method a dial­
a-porn provider would issue a personal identification number or access code number to a 
customer upon verification that the individual seeking the access code is 18 years of age or 
older. Id. at 123. 
67. Id. 
358 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:347 
these messages. 68 
b. Carlin II 
In 1985, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir­
cuit in Carlin II reviewed the constitutionality of the FCC's new regu­
latory scheme which the FCC developed as an alternative to time 
channeling.69 Under the new scheme, an adult wishing to hear a dial­
a-porn message had to obtain an access code by sUbmitting a written 
application to the service provider or making payment by credit card 
before access could be granted. 70 
Applying the same strict scrutiny standard employed in Carlin 
/,11 the court rejected the access code system, holding that it was not 
the least restrictive means to regulate the dial-a-porn industry in New 
York.72 The court reasoned that because the local telephone company 
used a one-way transmission system, and a two-way transmission sys­
tem was required to make the access code method a workable alter­
native, the access code system was not the least restrictive means 
available.73 The court concluded that the access code method was not 
technologically feasible and might force the Carlin dial-a-porn provid­
ers out of business in New York.74 Consequently, the court directed 
the FCC to further investigate the feasibility of a blocking system. 75 
68. Id. 
69. Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 787 F.2d 846, 847 (2d Cir. 1986) ("Carlin 
II"). 
70. Enforcement of Prohibition Against the Use of Common Carriers for the Trans­
mission of Obscene Materials, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,699,42,705,42,706 (1985). 
71. Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 749 F.2d at 121. The court used the strict 
scrutiny test announced in Carlin I as the standard of review for the regulations promul­
gated by the FCC on dial-a-porn because content-based restrictions are scrutinized more 
closely. The standard set forth by the court stated that "[t]he government bears the heavy 
burden of demonstrating that the compelling state interest could not be served by restric­
tions that are less intrusive on protected forms of expression." Id. at 121. See infra notes 
125, 213 and accompanying text for a discussion of the application of strict scrutiny to 
content-based regulations. 
72. Carlin II, 787 F.2d at 856. 
73. Id. at 854-56. 
74. Id. at 848. 
75. Id. at 856. The Commission had also argued that a system of "scrambling" 
would be an effective means to regulate dial-a-porn. Under this scheme, the message 
would be scrambled and adults desiring to access the service would be required to install a 
decoding device on their phone that would unscramble the message. However, the court 
rejected this option because it found that such a system would impose an unfair burden on 
adults wishing to use dial-a-porn by requiring them to purchase descramblers at a cost of 
$15.00 to $20.00 each. The Commission recognized that the effect of such a regulatory 
scheme would impose a twenty-four hour restriction on individuals who want to hear these 
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c. Carlin III 
Finally, in Carlin III,76 the Second Circuit upheld the FCC's 
dial-a-porn regulatory scheme as set forth in its third report and order 
released in May 1987.77 The new scheme had maintained the access 
code and credit card provisions, but was amended to include two addi­
tional defenses: message scrambling and billing notification. 78 
Carlin Communications challenged the FCC's third attempt at 
regulating the dial-a-porn industry. Carlin Communications argued 
that these regulations, in particular the requirement of a written appli­
cation to obtain an access code, had a "chilling effect" on the First 
Amendment rights of adults.79 Carlin Communications feared that 
many adults would forego the opportunity to exercise their First 
Amendment right to hear these messages because they would not want 
their identities disclosed by way of government subpoena power. 80 
Despite the petitioner's protestations, the court found that these regu­
lations did not unreasonably restrict adult access and that the compel-
messages, but do not have the proper devices. Id. at 853. See infra notes 151-71 and 
accompanying text for a description of the blocking mechanisms. 
76. Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 837 F.2d 546 (2d Cir.) ("Carlin III"), cert. 
denied, 488 U.S. 924 (1988). 
17. Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Use of Common Carriers For Transmission 
of Obscene Materials, 52 Fed. Reg. 17,760 (1987). 
78. Billing notification is the process by which the message provider requests in writ­
ing to the carrier that calls to the message service be identified on a customer's bill as being 
made to an adult message service. Under this scheme, the dial-a-porn provider must com­
ply with the billing notification requirement to be able to successfully assert any of the 
other safe harbor defenses to prosecution. See In re Enforcement of Prohibitions Against 
the Use of Common Carriers for the Transmission of Obscene Materials, 2 F.C.C.R. 2714, 
2721-22 (1987); see also 47 C.F.R. § 64.201(a)(5) (1992). 
The FCC justified its retention of the access code system by pointing out that New 
York would soon have the two-way transmission capabilities required for implementation. 
Carlin III, 837 F.2d at 554 (citing In re Enforcement of Prohibitions Against the Use of 
Common Carriers for the Transmission of Obscene Materials, 2 F.C.C.R. 2714, 2720 
(1987». Furthermore, neither the court nor the Commission was convinced by the argu­
ment that the plan was overly intrusive because adults were required to disclose their iden­
tity to obtain access codes for the provider. See id. at 557; see also In re Enforcement of 
Prohibitions Against the Use of Common Carriers for the Transmission of Obscene Materi­
als, 2 F.C.C.R. at 2724 n.24. The Commission also argued that its additional defense of 
scrambling "was less expensive than customer premises blocking" and suggested that "the 
message provider could use the sale of descramblers as an additional business opportunity." 
Carlin III, 837 F.2d at 554-55. 
79. Carlin III, 837 F.2d at 557. 
80. Id. In one instance, the United States Attorney for the District of Utah obtained 
indictments against Carlin Communication employees for violation of 47 U.S.c. § 223(a) 
and 18 U.S.C. §§ 1462, 1465. The indictments were eventually dismissed. The United 
States Attorney had attempted to subpoena Carlin Communications and the telephone 
company's list of individuals who had accessed the dial-a-porn numbers in the process of 
obtaining indictments. Id. at 557 n.4. 
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ling government interest in protecting minors could not, at this time, 
be served by a less restrictive means.81 However, the court instructed 
the FCC to consider other possibly less restrictive means of regulating 
dial-a-porn, such as beep-tone devices82 or blocking schemes, if and 
when they became technologically feasible. 
3. 	 The Telephone Decency Act: Congress' Total Ban on 
Indecent Dial-a-Porn Messages and the Supreme 
Court's Response in Sable 83 
In 1988, less than one year after the Carlin III decision, Congress 
amended the Communications Act of 1934 and superseded the regula­
tions upheld in Carlin III with a new section 223 (Telephone Decency 
Act).84 The new version of section 223 completely banned the dis­
semination of all indecent and obscene messages transmitted by inter­
state telephone for profit.8s 
The judicial response to Congress' actions initiating a total ban 
followed closely upon the new section's enactment. The United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York was the first 
court to face a challenge to Congress' total ban. In Roe v. Meese,86 the 
court, relying on Carlin III,87 granted the plaintiffs' request to enjoin 
the defendant (United States Attorney General Meese) from enforcing 
section 223 as it related to indecent speech.88 At the same time, Sable 
81. 	 Carlin III, 837 F.2d at 557. 
82. Beep-tone devices require that a beep-tone occur at the beginning of each sexu­
ally explicit recorded message. The customer would have a device installed at their prem­
ises which would detect the beep-tone and automatically terminate the call. See In re 
Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Use of Common Carriers for Transmission of Ob­
scene Materials, 2 F.C.C.R. 2714, 2718 (1987) (discussing beep-tone devices as a way to 
reduce the number of children reaching dial-a-porn providers by phone). 
83. 	 Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989). 
84. 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) (1988). The amended statute provided in relevant part: 
(b)(2) Whoever knowingly­
(A) in the District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign communication, by 
means of telephone, makes (directly or by recording device) any indecent commu­
nication for commercial purposes to any person, regardless of whether the maker 
of such communication placed the call; or 
(B) permits any telephone facility under such person's control to be used for any 
activity prohibited by clause (i); shall be fined not more than $50,000 or impris­
oned not more than six months or both. 
Id. 
85. School Improvement Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-297, § 6101, 102 
Stat. 423 (1988) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.c. § 223 (1988». 
86. 	 689 F. Supp. 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
87. Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 837 F.2d 546 (2d Cir.) ("Carlin III"), cert. 
denied, 488 U.S. 924 (1988). 
88. 	 Roe v. Meese, 689 F. Supp. 344, 347-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). In Roe, the plaintiffs 
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Communications of California, a branch of Carlin Communications, 
Inc., was presenting its own challenge to the Telephone Decency Act 
in the United States District Court for the Central District of Califor­
nia.89 Sable's First Amendment challenge to the constitutionality of 
the Telephone Decency Act was eventually heard by the United States 
Supreme Court. 
In Sable,90 the Supreme Court upheld section 223(b) as it applied 
to obscene speech, but struck it down as it pertained to indecent 
speech.91 The Court held that indecent dial-a-porn messages are pro­
tected by the First Amendment and, therefore, a total ban of such 
messages was unconstitutional.92 The Court, applying strict scrutiny, 
reasoned that the Government may regulate the content of constitu­
tionally protected speech to serve a compelling interest if it chooses 
the least restrictive means available to achieve its goal. 93 The Court 
recognized that protecting minors from hearing these messages is a 
compelling government interest.94 However, to withstand constitu­
tional scrutiny, the Government must serve this interest" 'by nar­
rowly drawn regulations designed to serve those interests without 
unnecessarily interfering with First Amendment freedoms.' "95 The 
Court concluded that a total ban was" 'legislation, [that was] not rea­
sonably restricted to the evil with which it is said to deal.' "96 Instead, 
the legislation had reduced what adults may hear to that which is ap­
propriate for children in violation of their First Amendment free 
speech rights.97 The Court went on to distinguish Pacifica 98 because it 
applied to broadcasts, which are a more invasive form of communica­
tion.99 The Court further noted that the Pacifica Court was not faced 
with the issue of a total ban, but rather an attempt to channel the 
times at which indecent broadcasts could be aired. 1°O 
The Court found insufficient evidence in the congressional record 
were providers of sexually explicit, live telephone conversations paid for in advance by 
credit card. Id. 
89. Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 692 F. Supp. 1208 (C.O. Cal. 1988). 
90. Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989). 
91. Id. at 117. 
92. Id. at 126. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. (citations omitted). 
96. Id. at 127 (quoting Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957». 
97. Butler, 352 U.S. at 383-84. 
98. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
99. Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. liS, 127 (1989). 
100. Id. 
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to show that the FCC's most recent regulations were ineffective. 101 
Rather, the Supreme Court found evidence in the record to support 
the FCC's conclusion that access codes, credit cards, and scrambled 
messages would be an effective means to achieve the Government's 
compelling interest if th~y were given an opportunity to work. 102 
In fact, several interest groups offered testimony at a House hear­
ing and expressed a desire to try out the FCC's most recent regu­
latory scheme. 103 The Supreme Court found this testimony quite 
persuasive. 104 
When the Supreme Court struck down the amendment instituting 
a total ban, the dial-a-porn industry was essentially left unregulated. lOS 
This is because the 1988 amendment to section 223(b) replaced the 
FCC regulations which were formerly part of that section. To com­
port with the standard set forth in Sable, Congress was now left with 
the task of drafting a statute that would serve its compelling interest of 
protecting children from indecent dial-a-pom messages while at the 
same time finding the least restrictive means to achieve this goal. 
II. PRINCIPAL CASES 
A. 	 Broadcast: Action For Children's Television v. FCC ("Act 
11")106 
In Action for Children's Television v. FCC ("Act 1"),107 several 
broadcasters petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia for review of the FCC order that adopted a ge­
neric definition of indecency. lOS The petitioners alleged that the order 
was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. 109 On appeal, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld the Com­
101. Id. at 130 n.8. See infra notes 114-17 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
the most recent regulations on broadcast indecency. 
102. In Sable, the Court stated that in the hearings on H.R. 1786 (The Telephone 
Decency Act), "the Committee heard testimony from the FCC and other witnesses that the 
FCC rules would be effective and should be tried out in practice." Id. at 130 n.9. 
103. Telephone Decency Act of1987: Hearing on H.R. 1786 before the Subcommittee 
on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 
l00th Cong., 1st Sess. 129-30, 132-33, 195-96, 198-200,230-31 (1987). 
104. 	 Sable, 492 U.S. at 130; see also Petersen, supra note 46, at 2041. 
105. 	 Petersen, supra note 46, at 2042. 
106. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("Act 
II"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1281-82 (1992). 
107. 	 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("Act I"). 
108. [d. at 1332. See supra notes 27-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
the generic definition of indecency and a general discussion of the evolution of the defini­
tion of indecency. 
109. 	 Act I, 852 F.2d at 1334-35. 
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mission's generic definition of indecency.110 However, it also found 
that the FCC did not give sufficient consideration as to what hours 
children were more likely to be in the broadcast audience when it es­
tablished the time after which indecent broadcasts could be aired. I I I 
The court instructed the FCC to reconsider "after a full and fair hear­
ing, ... the times at which indecent material may be broadcast."112 
The court stated that the FCC had failed to adduce evidence sufficient 
to support its time channeling efforts, especially in light of the First 
Amendment interests involved. 113 
However, before the FCC could complete this task, Congress was 
successful in pursuing its own agenda for protecting the young from 
exposure to indecent broadcasts. On October 1, 1988, two months 
after the Act I decision, a rider was attached to the FCC's Budget 
Appropriations Bill demanding that the provisions of title 18 section 
1464 of the United States Code, prohibiting indecent broadcasts, be 
enforced on a twenty-four hour-a-day basis. I 14 
In accordance with the legislative mandate, the Commission 
abandoned its plans to create a thorough record to support its chan­
neling efforts lIS and adopted a new rule banning indecent broadcasts 
on a twenty-four hour basis. 116 The District of Columbia Circuit 
stayed enforcement of the ban pending judicial review. 117 
110. Id. at 1334. 
111. Prior to the imposition of the twenty-four hour ban, the FCC determined that 
12:00 midnight was the time when the risk of children being in the broadcast audience 
would be minimized. See supra note 42. 
112. Act I, 852 F.2d at 1344. 
113. Id. at 1335. The court also criticized the FCC's use of statistics for the age 
group of 12 to 17 for its channeling purposes because in the FCC's brief to the Supreme 
Court in Pacifica, it had cited the relevant age group as only including children under 12. 
Id. at 1341-42. The Act I court instructed the FCC that if it planned on changing the age 
group from "under twelve" to "twelve [through] seventeen," it should explain its reasons 
for so doing. Id. Additionally, the court stated that if the FCC intended to continue 
"under twelve" to be the age group of concern, it should obtain data and statistics reflecting 
the viewing or listening habits of that section of the population. Id. 
114. Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, The Judiciary and Related Agen­
cies Appropriation Act, 1989, PUb. L. No. 100-459, § 608, 102 Stat. 2228 (1988); see also 
In re Enforcement of Prohibition Against Broadcast Obscenity and Indecency, 65 Rad. 
Reg. 2d (P & F) 1038 (Dec. 23, 1988). See supra note 1.6 for language set forth in 18 U.S.c. 
§ 1464. 
115. Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast Obscenity and Indecency in 18 
U.S.C. § 1464,4 F.C.C.R. 457 (1988). 
116. Id.; see also Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, The Judiciary and 
Related Agencies Appropriation Act 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-459, § 608, 102 Stat. 2228 
(1988). 
117. See Action for Children's Television v. FCC, No. 88-1916 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 13, 
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Action for Children's Television v. FCC ("Act II"), 118 presented a 
First Amendment challenge to the FCC's new Order, banning all 
indecent radio and television broadcasts.l19 The petitioners, a group 
of broadcasters, industries, and public interest groups, argued that 
Supreme Court and federal courts of appeals precedent dictated that a 
total ban on indecent speech in any medium is unconstitutional. I2o 
They further asserted that a total ban on indecent broadcasts would 
not satisfy the strict standard announced by the Supreme Court in 
Sable. 121 The District of Columbia Circuit, in Act II, agreed with the 
petitioners. 
The Act II court held that neither Congress' nor the FCC's ac­
tions imposing a total ban on radio and television broadcasts could 
pass constitutional muster. 122 The court stated that it was not ignor­
ing Congress' legislative authority to impose a total ban. However, 
because a total ban was unconstitutional, the court noted that Con­
gress' actions could not prohibit the FCC from creating a "safe har­
bor" defense to the regulation of indecent broadcasts, such as 
1989); In re Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast Indecency in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1464, 4 F.C.C.R. 8358 (1989). 
Before briefing and oral argument on the merits of the ban, the Supreme Court ren­
dered its decision in Sable which declared that a ban on indecent telephone messages was 
unconstitutional. Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). The FCC 
sought and obtained a remand from the D.C. Circuit "in order to assemble data supporting 
a total ban." Action for Children's Television v. FCC, No. 88-1916 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 13, 
1989); see also In re Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast Indecency in 18 
U.S.C. § 1464,4 F.C.C.R. 8358 (1989). The FCC believed that the Sable decision left the 
door open for a twenty-four hour ban on indecent broadcasts if no alternative means could 
be found that would adequately shield minors from exposure to indecent broadcasts. Fi­
nally, the Commission solicited public comment on the validity of the twenty-four hour 
ban. Id. at 8364; see also Act II, 932 F.2d at 1507. 
The Commission later issued a report concluding that a twenty-four hour ban was 
constitutional in light of the Sable decision because there was a "reasonable risk that signif­
icant numbers of children ages 17 and under listen to radio and view television at all 
times." Act II, 932 F.2d at 1507 (citing In re Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broad­
cast Indecency in 18 U.S.C. § 1464,5 F.C.C.R. 5297 (1990». Thus, the Commission con­
cluded that there was no alternative that could effectively serve the Government's 
compelling interest of protecting children from seeing and hearing such material. Id. 
118. 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("Act II"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1281-82 
(1992). 
119. Act II, 932 F.2d at 1508; see In re Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broad­
cast Indecency in 18 U.S.C. § 1464, 5 F.C.C.R. 5297 (1990). 
120. Act II, 932 F.2d at 1508-09. The petitioners cited Sable Communications, Inc. 
v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989), and Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332 
(D.c. Cir. 1988) ("Act I"), in support of their argument that the Government may not 
completely suppress indecent speech in any medium, and therefore a total ban could not be 
justified. 
121. Act II, 932 F.2d at 1508. 
122. Id. at 1509. 
19931 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-1ST AMENDMENT-A POST-SABLE LOOK 365 
providing a broadcaster with a defense to prosecution for the broad­
cast of indecent programming when indecent material is aired late at 
night when children are less likely to be in the audience. 123 
The Act II court stated that in Act I it held that indecent speech 
was protected by the First Amendment, and could be regulated by the 
FCC only if the regulation was made with respect for the value of free 
speech and peoples' rights to both say and hear what they choose.1 24 
In relying on the constitutional standards set forth in Sable and ap­
plied in Act I, the Act II court concluded that, because this was a 
content-based restriction, it should apply a strict constitutional stan­
dard. 125 Under this standard, the Government must choose the least 
restrictive means to serve its interest in protecting children. 126 
The court ruled that implicit in its holding in Act I was the notion 
that a total ban would not survive this level of scrutiny. 127 To further 
support its reliance on the reasoning of Act I, the court determined 
that the Supreme Court's decision in Sable bolstered "the precedential 
force of Act 1,"128 in that Sable struck down a total ban on indecent 
dial-a-porn messages, reaffirmed the protected status of indecent 
speech, and confirmed the necessity of applying a strict constitutional 
standard to government regulations aimed at the content of such 
speech.129 The Act II court noted that the Sable Court had stated that 
" '[s]exual expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected 
by the First Amendment,' " and the Government may" 'regulate the 
content of constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a 
compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further 
the articulated interest.' "130 
123. Id. at 1509-10. The Court stated, "just as the FCC may not ignore the dictates 
of the legislative branch, neither may the judiciary ignore its independent duty to check the 
constitutional excesses of Congress." Id.; see also Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Vir­
ginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843 (1978) ("Deference to a legislative finding cannot limit judicial 
inquiry when First Amendment rights are at stake."). 
124. Act 11,932 F.2d at 1508 (citing Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852 
F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("Act /"». 
125. Id. at 1509. When the Government regulates speech based on its content, the 
government must use the least restrictive means to further a compelling government inter­
est. Here the regulations at issue are content-based because only indecent telephone 
messages are subject to the strict regulations. Other dial-it services are not subject to these 






130. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 
liS, 126 (1989». 
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Finally, the court pointed out that before Congress passed the 
appropriations rider, even the FCC had supported the court's position. 
It was the FCC's view in 1988 that to comport with First Amendment 
standards, title 18 section 1464 of the United States Code should not 
be interpreted to mean that indecent material could never be 
broadcast. 131 
Thus, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, having 
struck down an act of Congress as unconstitutional, left the FCC in 
the same position it was in after Act I and before the passage of the 
appropriation's rider containing the instruction to the FCC to institute 
the twenty-four hour ban. Once again, the court instructed the FCC 
to resume the plan it had previously abandoned, which was to 
" 'redetermin[e], after a full and fair hearing, ... the times at which 
indecent material may be broadcast.' "132 
B. 	 The Helms Amendment: Congress' Attempt to Regulate Dial-a­
Porn 133 
After Sable, some members of Congress were anxious to "clamp 
down" on the dial-a-pom industry.134 In 1989, President Bush signed 
into law an amendment to section 223 of the Communications Act of 
1934 known as the Helms Amendment. \3S Section 223 is composed 
131. 	 Id. (citing Memorandum Opinion and Order, 3 F.e.c.R. 930, 931 (1987». 
132. 	 Id. at 1510 (quoting Action for Children's Television, 852 F.2d 1332, 1344 
(D.C. Cir. 1988) ("Act I"». Since the Act II decision, President Bush signed a bill (H.R. 
REP. No. 2977, 102nd Cong., 2d. Sess. (1992» on August 26, 1992, directing the FCC to 
promulgate regulations to prohibit the broadcasting of indecent programming between the 
hours of 6:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m. by any public radio station or public television station 
that goes oft' the air at or before midnight. For all other radio and television stations, the 
new law demands that they refrain from airing indecent programs between the hours of 
6:00 a.m. and 12:00 midnight. Public Telecommunications Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102­
356, § 16, 106 Stat. 954 (1992). 
In October of 1992, the FCC began to implement the congressional mandate. See 
FCC Proceeding to Implement Regulations To Restrict Broadcasting Of Indecent Pro­
gramming, 1992 FCC Lexis 5392 (September 17, 1992). See also Gillett Communications 
of Atlanta, Inc. v. Becker, 807 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Ga. 1992), for a case applying the new 
time channeling regulations to a television broadcast. 
The Act II court also instructed the FCC to address other related concerns. For ex­
ample, the court requested the FCC to more clearly define the following terms with respect 
to the definition of indecency: relevant age group, reasonable risk, children, and scope of 
Government interest. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504, 1510 (D.C. 
Cir. 1991) ("Act II"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1281-82 (1982). 
133. 	 47 U.S.C. § 223(b), (c) (Supp. II 1990). 
134. 	 See H.R. REP. No. 247, IOlst Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 585 (1989). 
135. 	 47 U.S.C. § 223(b), (c) (Supp. II 1990). The amendment provided in relevant 
part 
(b)(2) Whoever knowingly­
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of two parts: a statutory section 223(c) promulgated by Congress and 
a regulatory section 223(b) promulgated by the FCC. The scheme em­
bodied in the 1989 amendment to section 223(c) has been widely re­
ferred to as "reverse blocking." Reverse blocking is the process by 
which a telephone company will, at its central office, prevent calls 
from going through to specified exchanges or numbers unless the cus­
tomer l:!-ffirmatively requests access.136 Under section 223(c), tele­
phone companies are required to implement reverse blocking where 
technically feasible, only if they provide billing and collection services 
to indecent dial-a-pom providers. 137 Telephone companies are 
shielded from prosecution for allowing an individual under eighteen 
years of age to gain access to a dial-a-pom message under this statute 
if they have acted in good faith in determining whether or not to block 
or permit access to a dial-a-pom provider. 138 
If the dial-a-pom provider bills and collects through the tele­
phone company, they must comply with the FCC regulations in sec­
tion 223(b) and the reverse blocking requirement in section 223(c) in 
order to have a defense to prosecution,139 The FCC has noted that 
compliance with the regulations in section 223(b) is necessary to effec­
tuate the goal of the statutory scheme embodied in 223( c). 140 
(A) within the United States, by means of telephone, makes (directly or by re­
cording device) any indecent communication for commercial purposes which is 
available to any person under 18 years of age or to any other person without that 
person's consent, regardless of whether the maker of such communication placed 
the calJ; or 
(B) permits any telephone facility under such person's control to be used for an 
activity prohibited by subparagraph (A), shall be fined not more than $50,000, or 
imprisoned not more than six months, or both. . . . 
(3) It is a defense to prosecution under paragraph (2) of this subsection that the 
defendant restrict access to the prohibited communication to persons 18 years of 
age or older in accordance with subsection (c) of this section and with such proce­
dures as the Commission may prescribe by regulation. . . . 
(c)(I) A common carrier within the District of Columbia or within any State, or 
in interstate or foreign commerce, shall not, to the extent technically feasible, 
provide access to a communication specified in subsection (b) of this section from 
the telephone of any subscriber who has not previously requested in writing the 
carrier to provide access to such communication if the carrier collects from sub­
scribers an identifiable charge for such communication that the carrier remits, in 
whole or in part, to the provider of such communication. 
Id. 
136. In re Regulations Concerning Indecent Communications by Telephone, 5 
F.C.C.R. 4926, 4935 n.16 (1990). 
137. 47 U.S.c. § 223(c) (Supp. II 1990). See supra note 135 for text of § 223(c)(l). 
138. Id. § 223(c)(2)(A), (B). 
139. Id. § 223(b). 
140. In re Regulations Concerning Indecent Communications By Telephone, 5 
F.C.C.R. 4926, 4926-34 (1990). 
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In its June 29, 1990 Report and Order, the FCC also responded 
to the Sable decision by implementing new regulations at the direction 
of Congress pursuant to section 223(b). These new regulations, 
promulgated by the FCC, are "safe harbor defenses" for dial-a-porn 
providers. 141 Under the FCC regulations, a dial-a-porn provider will 
avoid liability if it meets the following three requirements: (1) it has 
notified the carrier of its services that it offers sexually explicit 
messages, (2) it has requested the carrier to specifically identify these 
calls on the customer's bill, and (3) it has required the adult user of the 
services to pay by credit card, obtain an access code, or use a descram­
bler.142 Both the statutory and the FCC defenses are available to those 
who" 'restrict access to persons under eighteen years of age.' "143 Ad­
ditionally, the FCC codified the legislature's "reverse blocking" re­
quirement making it part of the regulatory scheme set forth in section 
223, the creation of which was mandated by Congress. l44 The FCC 
did this in an attempt to make it clear that the mandatory blocking in 
section 223( c) is not an alternate defense to the FCC regulations, but 
must be complied with in addition to the FCC regulations unless the 
dial-a-porn provider engages in independent billing and collections, in 
which case, it would not be subject to reverse blocking. 145 
Almost two years after the Sable decision, and less than one year 
after the issuance of two FCC reports that supported various legisla­
tive and regulatory schemes designed to restrict the dissemination of 
indecent material,146 two federal courts of appeals were confronted 
141. Id. at 4926. See the FCC regulations codified in 47 C.F.R. § 64.201 (1990). 
142. 47 C.F.R. § 64.201 (1990); Information Providers' Coalition for Defense of the 
First Amendment v. FCC, 928 F.2d 866, 871 (9th Cir. 1991). 
143. Information Providers' Coalition, 928 F.2d at 872 (quoting 47 U.S.C. 
§ 223(b)(3) (Supp. II 1990». 
144. In re Regulations Concerning Indecent Communications By Telephone, 5 
F.C.C.R. 4926, 4932 (1990); see also 47 C.F.R. § 64.20 1 (b) (1990). 
145. 47 U.S.C. § 223(c) (Supp. II 1990). See supra note 135 for text of § 223(c). See 
also infra note 159 for a further discussion of how the reverse blocking requirement works 
in relation to the FCC regulations. 
The legislative history is not clear as to why the dial-a-porn provider is not subject to 
reverse blocking if it bills the customer for its services directly. However, one possibility is 
that Senator Helms and others involved in sponsoring the legislation created this exemp­
tion for dial-a-porn providers in the spirit of compromise, knowing full well that independ­
ent billing and collections (Le. through credit card sales) was much more costly than billing 
and collections through the telephone company. Therefore, dial-a-porn providers choos­
ing to engage in independent billing mechanisms would lose customers since it would make 
calls more expensive and would exclude a whole group of callers, namely those individuals 
who are not credit card holders. Furthermore, at least one court has noted that the costs 
of independent billing would reduce the number of dial-a-porn providers. See American 
Info. Enters., Inc. v. Thornburgh, 742 F. Supp. 1255, 1264 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
146. In re Regulations Concerning Indecent Communications by Telephone, 5 
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with First Amendment challenges launched against these restrictions. 
The attacks were directed toward regulations affecting the dial-a-porn 
industry. Specifically, several groups challenged the 1989 amendment 
to section 223 (the Helms Amendment) and the regulations accompa­
nying it as promulgated by the FCC. The petitioners in these casesl47 
argued, inter alia, 148 that these means were not the least restrictive 
available to serve the Government's compelling interest of protecting 
children from exposure to indecent speech as required under Sable .149 
Rather, they argued, there were more "speech-protective" alternatives 
that would serve the Government's compelling interest just as well. ISO 
C. 	 Dial-A-Porn: Information Providers' Coalition for Defense of 
the First Amendment v. FCC and Dial Information 
Services Corporation v. Thornburgh 
1. 	 Information Providers' Coalition for Defense of the First 
Amendment v. FCC lSI 
In March of 1991, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit responded to an attack on the constitutionality of the 
1989 Amendment to section 223 (the Helms Amendment) and the 
FCC regulations enacted thereunder. The petitioner, Information 
Providers' Coalition for Defense of the First Amendment ("the Coali­
tion"), was an association consisting of individuals and companies. ls2 
The petitioners attacked the constitutionality of the Helms Amend­
ment on several grounds. ls3 However, the court primarily focused on 
the issue of whether "reverse blocking," as opposed to "voluntary 
blocking," of telephone access to indecent dial-a-pom messages was 
F.C.C.R. at 4926; In re Enforcement of Prohibition Against Broadcast Indecency in 18 
U.S.C. § 1464, 5 F.C.C.R. 5297 (1990). 
147. Dial Info. Servs. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 938 F.2d 1535 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. de­
nied, 112 S. Ct. 966 (1992); Information Providers' Coalition for the Defense of the First 
Amendment v. FCC, 928 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1991). 
148. Generally the other arguments were attacks on the definition of indecency in 
addition to vagueness, overbreadth, and prior restraint challenges. See infra note 153. 
149. 	 Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115,126 (1989). 
150. Information Providers' Coalition, 928 F.2d at 868-69; Dial Info. Servs. Corp., 
938 F.2d at 1538-39. 
151. 	 928 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1991). 
152. The intervenors included Ameritech operating companies, GTE Service Corpo­
ration, Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, and regional Bell operating companies. Id. 
at 869. 
153. The petitioners raised vagueness challenges against the FCC's definition of in de­
cency. They also argued that the reverse blocking requirement constituted a prior restraint 
on speech. Id. at 874-79. 
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narrowly tailored enough to pass Fidt Amendment scrutiny.IS4 
The petitioners argued that the Helms Amendment violated the 
First Amendment because the means used to achieve the compelling 
ends of protecting children from indecent dial-a-porn were not the 
least restrictive under the standard set forth in Sable .ISS Rather, they 
argued that voluntary, or central office, blockinglS6 which provides ac­
cess to all individuals unless they request that their lines be blocked, is 
not only effective, but is also the least restrictive of the two types of 
blocking. Therefore, the petitioners asserted that voluntary blocking 
is the only method of blocking that meets the strictures of the Sable 
test. The petitioners maintained that voluntary blocking, currently 
implemented in New York and twenty-nine other states, should be an 
alternative safe harbor under section 223 providing a defense to carri­
ers in those areas where this option is feasible. ls7 
The court found that it had jurisdiction to review the Commis­
sion's regulations1s8 and proceeded to provide an interpretation of the 
reverse blocking provision as set forth in section 223. The court em­
phasized that reverse blocking is one of several layers of safe harbor 
defenses under section 223 and would only be a required restriction to 
access when the telephone carrier is responsible to the dial-a-porn pro­
vider for billing and collection services of the dial-a-porn provider. 
The court emphasized that no blocking is required under section 223 
where the dial-a-porn provider (1) bills the customer directly and (2) 
accepts payment by credit card or requires.· access codes or 
descramblers. ls9 
154. Id. at 868-69. 
155. Id. at 869. 
156. Voluntary blocking is an "opt out" method, whereas reverse blocking is an "opt 
in" alternative. See id. See supra note 66 and accompanying text for a further description 
of voluntary blocking. 
157. Id. at 872-73. 
158. Id. at 869; see 47 U.S.C. § 402(a); 28 u.s.c. § 2342(1) (granting the United 
States District Courts power to review and/or enjoin FCC final regulations). 
159. Information Providers' Coalition for Defense of the First Amendment v. FCC, 
928 F.2d 866, 872 (9th Cir. 1991). Under § 223, adults wishing to gain access to dial-a­
porn services must first meet the statutory requirements by requesting in writing to the 
telephone company that the phone be unblocked. The individual must then comply with 
FCC regulations promulgated pursuant to § 223 by using a credit card to pre-pay for the 
call, obtaining an access code by request in writing, or using a descrambling device (which 
the individual must also request from the provider) before he or she is allowed to access the 
message. However, reverse blocking is not activated unless the dial-a-porn provider bills 
and collects through the telephone company. When the dial-a-porn provider bills the cus­
tomer directly, reverse blocking is not mandated. However, even if the dial-a-porn pro­
vider bills the customer directly, it must still comply with the· FCC regulations under 
§ 223(b). This is evidenced by the clear language of subsection (b)(3) which provides that 
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In analyzing the issue presented, the court determined that before 
reaching the question of the constitutionality of the reverse blocking 
scheme under the First Amendment, it had to decide whether the 
Commission's findings that reverse blocking was technically feasible 
and that voluntary blocking was ineffective were supported by sub­
stantial evidence. 160 The court concluded that the Commission's find­
ings were in fact supported by substantial evidence. In so doing, the 
court relied on the evidence adduced in the comments to the FCC 
which were provided by a variety of interested parties, including tele­
phone companies familiar with telephone technologies, and religious 
organizations such as the Religious Alliance. 161 
In concluding that the Commission set forth substantial evidence 
to show voluntary blocking was an ineffective means to prevent chil­
dren from gaining access to dial-a-porn messages, the court empha­
sized the comments of the Coalition itself in which it recognized that 
the voluntary blocking alternative it proposed had ftaws. 162 For exam­
ple, the Coalition noted that voluntary blocking in California would 
not block calls made by minors to dial-a-porn services in other 
states. 163 However, the Coalition attempted to discount this obstacle 
by pointing out that New York and Texas were the only other states 
that provided this service. l64 New York had an exchange that could 
not be accessed by out-of-state customers, and in Texas only a "hand­
ful of such calls [were] actually completed."16S 
"[i]t is a defense to prosecution ... that the defendant restrict access to the prohibited 
communication to persons 18 years of age or older in accordance with subsection (c) and 
with such procedures as the commission may prescribe by regulation." 47 U.S.c. § 223 
(b)(3) (Supp. II 1990) (emphasis added). 
160. Id. at 869-70. Substantial evidence is the standard which must be met to up­
hold agency fact findings. Id. 
Judicial review of an agency fact finding regularly proceeds under the rubric of 
"substantial evidence" set forth in § 706(2)(E) of the APA [Administrative Pro­
cedure Act]. This does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but 
rather only "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as ade­
quate to support a conclusion." 
Id. (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 564-65 (1988». 
161. Id. at 872. In reaching its conclusion that the Commission's findings were sup­
ported by substantial evidence, the court cited evidence presented to the Commission by 
the Religious Alliance which stated that a substantial majority of all dial-a-porn calls were 
made by children between the ages of 10 and 16. Id. The court also deemed significant the 
comments from several state Attorney Generals who reaffirmed the importance of protect­
ing children from exposure to indecent dial-a-porn messages and noted their support for 
the reverse blocking system incorporated in the Helms Amendment. Id. at 872-73. 
162. Id. at 873-74. 
163. Id. at 873. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. Additional evidence presented by Southwestern Bell Telephone Company 
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Additionally, the court found that voluntary blocking would be 
ineffective to the extent that it did not "completely bar or totally im­
pede"l66 a minor's access to indecent telephone messages because vol­
untary blocking is often not requested until after a child has called the 
service and a parent has noticed it on a telephone bill. 167 The court 
concluded this remedy comes too late, after the physical and/or psy­
chological damage has already been done to the child. 168 
Finally, the court examined the FCC's final conclusions set forth 
in its June 29, 1990 Report and Order. 169 In this report, the FCC 
found that the regulations set forth in the Helms Amendment com­
ported with the least restrictive means test in Sable. Additionally, it 
concluded that as between the two types of blocking, voluntary and 
reverse, voluntary blocking was ineffective because ultimately only a 
small number of phones would be blocked. Therefore, a substantial 
number of minors would continue to have access to indecent dial-a­
porn messages. 170 Furthermore, the Commission noted that voluntary 
blocking does not prevent access from unblocked phones or calls to 
dial-a-porn services outside the state.171 
The court noted the Commission's conclusion that either type of 
blocking alone would not be a sufficient means to effectuate the Gov­
ernment's compelling interest in protecting children from gaining ac­
cess to telephonic indecent messages. 172 Based upon this premise, the 
FCC had justified the need for the additional regulatory safe harbors 
to fulfill the statute's purpose. 173 
Upon completing its review, the court held that substantial evi­
dence supported the Commission's findings that reverse blocking and 
the FCC regulations were technically feasible. 174 The court also found 
the regulations were narrowly and carefully tailored efforts designed to 
that voluntary blocking would be ineffective in preventing minors from gaining access to 





169. In re Regulations Concerning Indecent Communications by Telephone, 5 
F.C.C.R. 4926 (1990). 
170. Information Providers' Coalition for Defense of the First Amendment v. FCC, 
928 F.2d 866, 873 (9th Cir. 1991); see In re Regulations Concerning Indecent Communica­
tions by Telephone, 5 F.C.C.R. 4926, 4928 (1990). 
171. Information Providers' Coalition, 928 F.2d at 873. 
172. Id. 
173. See supra text accompanying notes 139-45 for a discussion of the FCC safe 
harbor regulations. 
174. Information Providers' Coalition, 928 F.2d at 879. 
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achieve the Government's compelling goal, and voluntary blocking 
alone was an ineffective means to serve this goal. 17S Thus, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that the 
Helms Amendment comported with the constitutional standard set 
forth in Sable and did not violate the First Amendment. 176 
2. Dial Information Services Corporation v. Thornburgh 177 
In July, 1991, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit rendered a decision in which it, too, addressed the constitu­
tionality of the Helms Amendment. The appeal to the Second Circuit 
arose from a preliminary injunction order entered in the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York. The order en­
joined the enforcement of the Helms Amendment on a nationwide ba­
sis pending further order to the District Court by the Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit. 178 
The plaintiffs-appellees, a host of dial-a-porn providers, chal­
lenged the constitutionality of the statute based on, inter alia, its fail­
ure to use the least restrictive means of serving the Government's 
compelling interest. 179 They argued that this statutory method of reg­
ulating indecent speech violated the First Amendment. After holding 
an evidentiary hearing, the district court concluded that voluntary 
blocking, as opposed to reverse blockingl80 or independent billing and 
collection, was the least restrictive means to effectuate the Govern­
ment's goal. The district court further found that the voluntary block­
ing method being used in New York at the time adequately protected 
children from exposure to indecent telephone messages. 181 The court 
emphasized the testimony of the president of Information Providers 
Association of California. He stated that voluntary blocking reduced 
the number of complaints by parents from one hundred monthly to 
one hundred annually.182 
175. Id. at 873-74, 879. 
176. Id. at 879. 
177. 938 F.2d 1535 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 966 (1992). 
178. Id. at 1536-37. The nationwide preliminary injunction was issued on the basis 
of the court's void for vagueness holding. The injunction was to be enforced only to the 
extent the restrictions imposed on "indecent" speech. Id. 
179. Id. 
180. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and district court used the tenn 
"pre-SUbscription method," which essentially is the same as reverse blocking. Voluntary 
blocking was being used in New York when these cases were argued. 
181. American Info. Enters., Inc. v. Thornburgh, 742 F. Supp. 1255, 1264 (S.D. N.Y. 
1990). 
182. Id. at 1266. 
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Additionally, the court was persuaded that under New York's 
voluntary blocking system, a call to a dial-a-porn service would appear 
on the customer's telephone bill, putting parents on notice. Yet, only 
four percent of 4.6 million households requested voluntary block­
ing. 183 Therefore, the court concluded, there was no substantial evi­
dence of complaints from parents about their children gaining access 
to these numbers.184 Furthermore, the court noted that many of the 
complaints received were from adults objecting generally to the con­
tent of these messages unaccompanied by allegations that a child had 
gained access. 18S 
The district court also discounted the importance of statements 
given by Dr. Dietz, a member of the Attorney General's 1986 Pornog­
raphy Commission. Dr. Dietz was an expert forensic psychologist. 
He testified that voluntary blocking would be an ineffective means of 
protecting children because a parent would not know a child has 
gained access to a dial-a-porn message until the call appears on a tele­
phone bill, after the damage had already been done. 186 In response to 
Dr. Dietz' testimony, the district court stated that 
[S]uch testimony supports the Court's finding that the government 
has a compelling interest in protecting minors, but it does not show 
that more than "a fe~ of the most enterprising and disobedient 
young people [can or are managing] to secure access to such [inde­
cent telephone] messages," despite the presence of a voluntary 
blocking· scheme. 187 
Moreover, the district court reasoned that the Supreme Court and fed­
eral courts of appeals have expressed the view that the primary re­
sponsibility for preventing children from gaining access to protected 
speech should rest on the parents. 188 Thus, the court maintained that 
voluntary blocking should not be abandoned just because the Govern­
ment feared that some parents may not be properly supervising their 
children. 
Finally, the district court agreed with the Government's expert 
witness that an independent billing scheme would not devastate the 





187. Id. (quoting Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 130-31 (1989». 
188. Id. at 1265; (see Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,639 (1968) and Fabulous 
Assocs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n., 896 F.2d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing 
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods., 463 U.S. 60, 73-74 (1983». 
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ing requirement could increase the cost of the calls, reduce the number 
of providers, make calls more costly, and exclude callers. 189 Thus, the 
court determined that reverse blocking and independent billing and 
collections were more restrictive on information providers and callers 
than the voluntary blocking system. In addition, the court noted that 
to require reverse blocking could have the effect of causing a large 
reduction in the number of callers or forcing the dial-a-porn industry 
to change the content of its messages. 190 Moreover, there was a likeli­
hood that the Government would not be able to meet its burden of 
showing that voluntary blocking is an ineffective means of protecting 
children. Accordingly, it concluded that there was a substantiallikeli­
hood that the Helms Amendment would violate the First Amendment 
because the Government did not, given all the technically feasible al­
ternatives available, choose the least restrictive means to achieve its 
compelling goal. 191 
The United States Attorney General appealed to the Court of Ap­
peals for the Second Circuit. 192 At the outset, the Second Circuit set 
forth its interpretation of the regulatory scheme embodied in section 
223. The court found that section 223(c) required telephone compa­
nies to limit access to dial-a-porn messages by using a system of re­
verse blocking where technically feasible and providing access to such 
services only to adults who request in writing that their telephone lines 
be "unblocked." 
Similar to the Ninth Circuit's interpretation in Information Prov­
iders' Coalition, under the Dial Information Services court's interpreta­
tion, the FCC regulations under section 223(b) provided a defense to 
dial-a-porn providers if they complied with the following three re­
quirements: (1) restricted access to those eighteen years and older, (2) 
gave written notice to the carriers that they were providers of indecent 
messages, and (3) required the user to make payment by credit card 
before providing access, use a descrambler, or use an access code 
which could be obtained upon written request of the customer. 193 The 
Dial Information Services court noted that alternatively, the FCC reg­
ulations provided that the dial-a-porn provider could engage in in­
189. Id. at 1264. 
190. Id. The court discussed the effect that reverse blocking had on the dial-a-porn 
industry in Pennsylvania, noting that although the businesses were not eliminated totally, 
many were in effect either driven out of business or forced to modify the content of their 
messages. 
191. Id. at 1266. 
192. Dial Info. Servs. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 938 F.2d 1535 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. de­
nied, 112 S. Ct. 966 (1992). 
193. Id. at 1539. 
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dependent billing and collection services and it would not then be 
subject to the reverse blocking restriction set forth in section 223(c). 194 
The court acknowledged the long-standing proposition that the 
Government has a compelling interest in protecting children from in­
decent speech.19S Next, the court applied the least restrictive means 
standard to determine whether the regulations embodied in the Helms 
Amendment could withstand strict constitutional scrutiny as set forth 
in Sable. 196 In applying the least restrictive means test announced in 
Sable, the Dial Information Services court, like the court in Informa­
tion Providers' Coalition, limited its analysis to the issue of whether the 
reverse blocking requirement, as opposed to voluntary blocking, was 
the least restrictive means to achieve the Government's compelling 
goal. 197 In so doing, the court stated that it was not enough to show 
that the ends were compelling. Rather, the means chosen must also 
be carefully tailored to achieve the end. The court reasoned that 
before the plaintiffs-appellees could prevail under the Sable test they 
must show "that there are other approaches less restrictive than the 
Helms Amendment but just as effective in achieving its goal of deny­
ing access by minors to indecent dial-a-porn messages."198 
After reviewing evidence adduced in the district court proceed­
ing, the court examined the alternative of voluntary blocking and 
found that it paled in comparison to reverse blocking in its ability to 
eliminate access by children to dial-a-porn. 199 The court found sup­
port for this conclusion based on evidence suggesting that voluntary 
blocking was available for over two years in New York, but only a 
small percentage of households had requested it.2°O It also cited re­
sults from an "Awareness Study" concluding that only one half of the 
New York households were aware of the existence of dial-a-porn or 
blocking methods.201 The Second Circuit also placed more signifi­
cance than the district court on the testimony of Dr. Dietz, in which 
he expressed the opinion that a one-time exposure to dial-a-porn could 
psychologically or physically harm a child,202 and concluded that vol­
untary blocking was not an effective means of preventing this harm 
194. Id. See supra note 159 and accompanying text for a discussion of when a dial-
a-porn provider is subject to the reverse blocking requirement and when it is not. 
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because a child is more likely to achieve this damaging one-time expo­
sure under the voluntary blocking scheme.203 The court reasoned that 
not only did this testimony strongly support the conclusion that vol­
untary blocking was an ineffective means of achieving Congress' com­
pelling goal, it also showed the effectiveness of reverse blocking. 204 
The court then concluded that the district court incorrectly ap­
plied the Sable test by "focusing on [the] means" and not the "goals 
[of Congress] as well as [the] means."205 The court reasoned that even 
if voluntary blocking was the least restrictive means, it was not as ef­
fective; and "simply [did] not do the job of shielding minors from dial­
a_porn."206 Therefore, the court held that the reverse blocking 
scheme of the Helms Amendment was "'a law narrowly tailored to 
serve [a compelling] interest.' "207 Thus, the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit as well as the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
upheld the constitutionality of the Helms Amendment. 
III. ANALYSIS 
The constitutionality of the current regulations imposed on the 
dissemination of indecent speech in the broadcast and dial-a-porn me­
diums is still an unanswered question. This is especially true in light 
of the post-Sable decisions discussed in the previous section. 
The federal courts of appeals in Information Providers' Coalition 
and Dial Information Services applied the strict scrutiny standard re­
quired by Sable and upheld the reverse blocking requirement of the 
Helms Amendment as the "least restrictive means" to achieve the 
Government's compelling goal of preventing children from gaining ex­
posure to indecent dial-a-pom messages. The United States Courts of 
Appeals for the Ninth and Second Circuits did this despite the availa­
bility of other less restrictive methods, such as voluntary blocking, 
which they found was not as effective as reverse blocking. On the 
other hand, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co­
lumbia Circuit used Sable's strict scrutiny standard for support and 
struck down the congressional ban on indecent broadcasts, holding 
that a total ban on the broadcast of protected speech did not pass con­
stitutional muster under the First Amendment. 
The attempts by the federal courts of appeals to apply the consti­
203. Id. 
204. Id. (emphasis added). 
205. Id. 
206. Id. 
207. Id. at 1543 (quoting Boos v. Barry. 485 U.S. 312, 324 (1988». 
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tutional standard set forth in Sable have added more confusion and 
created further unanswered questions as to what level of First Amend­
ment scrutiny the courts should apply in reviewing regulations aimed 
at controlling the dissemination of indecent speech through the dial-a­
porn and broadcast mediums, and whether both mediums should be 
subjected to the same level of scrutiny. Thus, the first issue this Note 
addresses is whether the Sable Court intended the test it set forth to 
review dial-a-porn regulations to be a strict scrutiny test. The second 
issue addressed is whether the Supreme Court intended the Sable stan­
dard to apply to indecent broadcasts as well as dial-a-porn messages. 
The final issue which this Note addresses is whether the federal courts 
of appeals in Information Providers' Coalition,208 Dial Information 
Services,209 and Act IJ2\O correctly applied that standard to the regula­
tions at issue in the post-Sable cases. 
A. Is the Sable Standard a Strict Scrutiny Test? 
According to the United States Supreme Court, the constitutional 
standard announced in Sable is the standard by which regulations 
aimed at controlling the dissemination of indecent dial-a-porn 
messages are to be reviewed. In determining whether the Sable stan­
dard is a strict scrutiny test, it is important to examine the exact lan­
guage used by the Court in setting forth the standard. In Sable, the 
Court set forth the following standard for reviewing dial-a-porn 
regulations: 
The Government may . . . regulate the content of constitutionally 
protected speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it 
chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest 
. . . . The Government may serve this legitimate interest, but to 
withstand constitutional scrutiny, "it must do so by narrowly drawn 
regulations designed to serve those interests without unnecessarily 
interfering with First Amendment freedoms ...." It is not enough 
to show that the Government's ends are compelling; the means 
must be carefully tailored to achieve those ends.211 
The "least restrictive means" language and the "compelling interest" 
208. Information Providers' Coalition for Defense of the First Amendment v. FCC, 
928 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1991). 
209. Dial Info. Servs. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 938 F.2d 1535 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. de· 
nied, 112 S. Ct. 966 (1992). 
210. Action for Children'S Television V. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("Act 
II"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1281-82 (1992). 
211. Sable Communications V. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (emphasis added) (ci· 
tations omitted). 
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language of the Sable standard indicate that the Court applied a strict 
scrutiny standard to government regulation of indecent telephone 
messages because the regulation at issue was a content-based restric­
tion on protected Speech.212 The Government, iIi enacting the amend­
ment to section 223(b), was not attempting to ban all di~-it services, 
but rather sought only to ban the transmission of indecent and obscene 
telephone messages based on the content of these messages. 
Content-based restrictions have historically been reviewed under 
an elevated level of scrutiny.213 The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit, in the Carlin trilogy, applied this same level of 
heightened scrutiny to its review of dial-a-porn regulations.214 The 
one exception to this general rule occurs in cases in which the courts 
examine regulations singling out indecent speech when those regula­
tions are not aimed at suppressing the indecent content of the speech. 
In such cases, courts apply an intermediate scrutiny standard instead 
of strict scrutiny review.2lS 
For example, in Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. ,216 the 
212. See infra note 258 for a discussion of the distinguishing language between inter­
mediate and strict scrutiny. See also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW, §§ 12-3, 12-18 (2d ed. 1988). . 
213. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980) 
("(W]hen [a] regulation is based on the content of speech, Governmental action must be 
scrutinized more carefully to ensure that communication has not been prohibited 'merely 
because public officials disapprove [of] the speaker's views.' "); see also Boos v. Barry, 485 
U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (stating that content-based restrictions on political speech get the most 
exacting scrutiny); and TRIBE, supra note 212, § 12-18, at 940. Professor Tribe stated that 
"once an expressive act is detennined to be within the coverage of the [F]irst 
[A]mendment, its entitlement to protection must not vary with the viewpoint expressed, 
and all attempts to create content-based SUbcategories entail at least some risk that [the] 
government will in fact be discriminating against disfavored points of view." Id. 
For a further discussion of content-based regulation of indecent speech see John C. 
Cleary, Note, Telephone Pornography: First Amendment Constraints on Shielding Children 
from Dial-A-Porn, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 503, 540-43 (1985). 
214. Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 837 F.2d 546, 555 (2d Cir.) ("Carlin 
III"), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 924 (1988); Carlin Communications, Inc. V. FCC, 787 F.2d 
846, 855 (2d Cir. 1986) ("Carlin II"); Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 749 F.2d 113, 
121 (2d Cir. 1984) ("Carlin I"). For a further discussion of the Carlin trilogy, and an 
argument that the court in Carlin II announced the strict scrutiny standard, but really 
applied a lower one to uphold the regulations, see Leah Murphy, Comment, The Second 
Circuit and Dial-A-Porn: An Unsuccessful Balance Between Restricting Minors' Access and 
Protecting Adults' Rights, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 685 (1989). 
215. See supra note 15 and accompanying text for a discussion of Renton V. Playtime 
Theatres. For thorough discussions of the distinction between content-based and content­
neutral regulations see Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 
46 (1987), Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulations and First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 189 (1983), and Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amend
ment, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 615 (1991). 
216. 475 U.S. 41 (1986). 
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Supreme Court held that a zoning ordinance aimed at controlling 
whether a movie theater could air sexually explicit adult movies de­
pending on its location, was not content-based in any meaningful sense 
and did not merit strict scrutiny review.217 In contrast to Sable, the 
Renton Court found that the ordinance at issue was not aimed directly 
at suppressing the speech because of its content. Rather, the court 
found that the ordinance was aimed at controlling the secondary ef­
fects that adult movie theaters might have on a particular area.2lS 
In Sable, the Government was not worried about the secondary 
effects of dial-a-porn messages. The regulation at issue in Sable was 
aimed at suppressing the dial-a-porn messages based strictly on the 
concern that their content would be harmful to children.219 Thus, 
based on Sable and the Carlin trilogy,220 it appears proper that the 
courts should apply strict scrutiny in reviewing content-based regula­
tions aimed at controlling the dissemination of indecent dial-a-porn 
messages. However, the question of whether this same level of scru­
tiny should be applied in reviewing content-based regulations imposed 
on the airing of indecent broadcasts is not as clear. 
B. Should the Sable Standard Have Been Applied in Act 111221 
In reviewing the constitutionality of the twenty-four hour ban on 
indecent broadcasts, the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis­
trict of Columbia Circuit in Act I and Act II applied strict scrutiny in 
reviewing the twenty-four hour ban on indecent broadcasts.222 The 
Act II court found support for its application of this elevated standard 
by noting that the Supreme Court in Sable reiterated that this strict 
standard must be applied to content-based restrictions on speech.223 
217. Id. at 47-50; see also Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 
(1976). 
218. Renton, 475 U.S. at 47-50. The Court concluded that the Government was 
concerned with preventing the creation of an environment in which drugs and prostitution 
would be encouraged if clusters of theaters were allowed to show sexually explicit movies. 
219. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1988). In Boos, the respondents ar­
gued that the ordinance at issue (a regulation on placing offensive signs in the vicinity of 
foreign embassies) was aimed at regulating secondary effects, namely, the psychological or 
emotional effects the content of such a sign might have on its audience. fd. The Court 
rejected the respondents argument and distinguished Renton. The court stated that the 
emotive or psychological effect of speech on an individual is not a "secondary effect" within 
the meaning of Renton. Id. at 321. 
220. See supra notes 54-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Carlin 
trilogy. 
221. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("Act 
fr), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1281-82 (1992). 
222. See supra notes 106-132 for a discussion of Act f and Act II. 
223. Id. 
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However, in the past, the Supreme Court has applied a lower level of 
scrutiny in reviewing content-based broadcast regulations.224 In FCC 
v. League of Women Voters, 225 the Court reviewed a content-based 
regulation on broadcasts under an intermediate scrutiny standard. 226 
In order to pass intermediate scrutiny, the Government must show 
that the regulation is narrowly tailored to further a substantial govern­
ment interest. 227 
Thus, the question arises as to whether the strict standard an­
nounced in Sable was applied properly by the Act II court in its review 
of the twenty-four hour ban on indecent broadcasts or whether inter­
mediate scrutiny should have been applied under FCC v. League of 
Women Voters. Arguably, the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit was incorrect in reviewing the constitutionality of 
the twenty-four hour ban under strict scrutiny. 
In reviewing the content-based regulation at issue in Act II, the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit failed to con­
sider the Supreme Court's decision in FCC v. League of Women Vot­
ers. Instead the court concluded that the regulation was content­
based and applied the strict scrutiny standard for reviewing indecent 
dial-a-porn messages as announced in Sable.228 However, the court 
did not address the differences between the dial-a-porn and broadcast 
mediums when it decided to follow Sable and apply strict scrutiny. 
One persuasive argument to support the application of intermediate 
scrutiny to content-based regulations on broadcasts, and not to dial-a­
porn, is that because broadcast is a more invasive form of communica­
tion with a "captive audience" problem, it receives the most limited 
First Amendment protection of all mediums of communication.229 
224. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984); see Benjamin Marcus, 
Recent Developments, FCC v. League of Women Voters: Conditions on Federal Funding 
that Inhibit Speech and Subject Matter Restrictions on Speech, 71 CoRNELL L. REv. 453 
(1986); see also Gayoso, supra note 22, at 884-85. 
225. 468 U.S. 364 (1984). 
226. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 398-99. The broadcast regulation at issue 
was a governmental prohibition on editorializing by public stations that received federal 
funding. Id. at 366. 
227. Id. at 398-99; see also infra note 258. 
228. 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). 
229. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978). "Captive audience" is a 
tenn of art used in First Amendment law to describe situations in which, because of the 
invasiveness of the speech, the individual is "forced" to listen to or see a message he or she 
may find offensive. Id. at 748-49 & n.27. The individual may only escape the message by 
averting hislher ears or eyes, or, in the case of television and radio, by turning it off. Id. 
For example, in Pacifica, the court found that radio listeners in the car and at home are a 
captive audience since they are constantly tuning in and out of particular stations and are 
unable to avoid hearing indecent broadcasts because they will often miss a prior warning 
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Since the broadcast medium is a more invasive form of communica­
tion than dial-a-pom it would be easier for a child to gain access to 
indecent programming. Therefore, more stringent regulation may be 
necessary in the broadcast medium to ensure the Government's inter­
est in protecting children from exposure to indecent speech is 
furthered. 
Based on the Supreme Court precedent in FCC v. League of Wo­
men Voters 230 and Pacijica,231 the court in Act II should have distin­
guished Sable because of the differing abilities of the two mediums to 
reach child audiences and applied intermediate scrutiny in reviewing 
the twenty-four hour ban.232 However, even under intermediate scru­
tiny, the twenty-four hour ban would not have passed constitutional 
muster for several reasons. First, it is important to note that although 
the Supreme Court in FCC v. League of Women Voters only applied 
intermediate scrutiny to the broadcast regulation at issue, the Court 
still struck it down as unconstitutional.233 Thus, the intermediate 
scrutiny contemplated by the Court to be used in reviewing content­
based broadcast regulations is not without "bite." 
concerning the offensive program content. Id. at 748-49. For several more examples of 
captive audience problems and a thorough discussion of the captive audience doctrine see 
Marcy Strauss, Redefining the Captive Audience Doctrine, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 85 
(1991). 
230. 468 U.S. 364 (1984). 
231. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
232. There is, of course, an opposing argument that the Act II court was correct in 
applying strict scrutiny to review the twenty-four hour ban because the same constitutional 
standard should apply to all content-based restrictions on speech. The argument is that if 
indecent speech is a protected category of speech in one medium, it should be equally 
protected in another, despite the higher level of intrusiveness characteristic of one medium 
as compared to another. In its August 6, 1990 Report, the FCC rejected the argument that 
the broadcast indecency prohibition should be judged under an intermediate scrutiny stan­
dard. In re Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast Indecency in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1464, 5 F.C.C.R. 5297 (1990). It concluded that the more rigorous standard applied by 
the Supreme Court in Sable was the proper one for the lower courts to apply. [d. How­
ever, in applying this standard to the twenty-four hour ban, the FCC concluded that the 
ban on indecent broadcasts was not a violation of the First Amendment. Id. It rested this 
conclusion primarily on two grounds. First, based on Justice Scalia's concurring opinion 
in Sable, the FCC interpreted Sable to mean that a total ban would be upheld in the broad­
cast medium if there were no alternative restrictions that could effectuate the goal. Id. at 
5302. Second, it argued that a total ban in the broadcast medium could survive strict 
scrutiny because that medium is a more invasive form of communication than the tele­
phone. Id. 
233. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 398-99 (1984). The Court held 
that the statute at issue "[was] not crafted with sufficient precision to remedy those dangers 
that may exist to justify the significant abridgment of speech worked by the provision's 
broad ban on editorializing. The statute is not narrowly tailored to address any of the 
Government's suggested goals." Id. 
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Second, a total ban on indecent broadcasts would likely be struck 
down under intermediate scrutiny review in light of the Supreme 
Court decisions in Pacifica 234 and Renton.235 In Pacifica, the Court 
took the approach that channeling indecent broadcasts to times of the 
day at which they could safely be aired, as opposed to banning them, 
was the proper way to regulate them.236 In Renton, the Court stated 
that an ordinance aimed at limiting the areas in which theaters could 
show adult movies passed intermediate scrutiny partly because it did 
not seek to ban adult movie theaters altogether.237 
Applying intermediate scrutiny, the court in Act II could have 
correctly concluded that a total ban on indecent broadcasts violated 
the First Amendment because such a ban was not narrowly tailored to 
achieving the Government's interest in protecting children from expo­
sure to indecent broadcasts. Although the Sable decision is not con­
trolling in the realm of indecent broadcasts, it does provide some legal 
support for the proposition that a total ban on a protected category of 
speech is hardly ever acceptable in light of First Amendment 
freedoms.238 
The Sable Court struck down a total ban on indecent dial-a-porn 
messages in part because the legislature did not produce sufficient evi­
dence to show that the FCC's current restrictions were ineffective.239 
Similarly, in Act II, there was insufficient evidence to conclude that 
significant numbers of children are in the broadcast audience at all 
times of the day and night. 
For example, time channeling, used by the FCC prior to the 
twenty-four hour ban, is an effective, but more narrowly tailored 
means than a total ban to protect children from gaining exposure to 
indecent broadcasts while at the same time protecting adults' First 
Amendment right to hear such programming. For example, a recent 
report issued by the Commission revealed that only one to four per­
cent of the broadcast audience consists of children during the school 
day hours and the late evening hours. 24O These statistics gathered by 
the FCC further revealed that during the evening hours, eighty-eight 
percent of children were under parental supervision. During the hours 
234. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
235. Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 (1986). 
236. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 733. 
237. Renton, 475 U.S. at 46-47. 
238. Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 130-31 (1989). 
239. Sable, 492 U.S. at 128-30. See supra notes 132-40 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of the FCC's current restrictions on dial-a-porn. 
240. In re Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast Indecency in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1464, 5 F.C.C.R. 5297, 5303 (1990). 
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between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m., ninety-three percent of the children 
in the broadcast audience were under parental supervision and ninety­
nine percent were under adult supervision. Between the hours of 12 
midnight and 6:00 a.m., over ninety-eight percent of the children were 
under parental supervision and ninety-nine percent were under adult 
supervision.241 
Thus, the conclusion that nothing short of a total ban could sat­
isfy the Government's interest in protecting children from indecent 
broadcasts because some children are in the audience twenty-four 
hours a day is erroneous. According to the Sable Court, the goal of 
protecting children from indecent speech may not include every child 
in the country because there may never be a fool-proof method of 
guaranteeing that a minor will never have access to indecent speech.242 
In fact, the Court recognized that the reality is some of "the most 
enterprising and disobedient young people would [always] manage to 
secure access to [indecent dial-a-porn]."243 Thus, a regulation need 
not be one-hundred percent effective in stopping all children from 
gaining access to indecent speech in order to pass constitutional mus­
ter.244 Therefore, time channeling rather than a total ban still fur­
thers the Government interest of protecting children, yet it does so in 
a way that does the least damage to First Amendment freedoms. 
Furthermore, in striking down Congress' twenty-four hour ban 
on dial-a-porn, the Sable Court noted that not only did Congress lack 
evidence to show that no less restrictive means were available, but 
Congress had not even given the FCC's regulations24s a chance to 
work.246 Similarly, in Act I the court instructed the FCC to solicit 
comments and conduct a full and fair hearing to determine the times 
at which indecent broadcasts could be aired, in addition to defining 
terms such as "children" and "reasonable risk."247 However, before 
the FCC was able to act, Congress imposed a total ban on indecent 
broadcasts248 without the benefit of the FCC's report. Thus, Congress 
and the FCC have not exerted sufficient effort in attempting to find a 
241. Id. at 5304. 




245. See supra notes 139-44 for a discussion of the FCC regulations. 
246. Sable, 492 U.S. at 130-31. 
247. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332, 1344 (D.C. Cir. 1988) 
("Act I"). 
248. Action For Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504, 1507 (D.C. Cir. 1991) 
("Act II"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1281-82 (1992). 
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workable means that is more narrowly tailored than a total ban. 
Rather, their efforts appear to be focused on trying to justify a total 
ban. 
Additionally, the FCC's reliance on the Supreme Court's distin­
guishing ofPacifica in Sable to support the position that a total ban on 
indecent broadcasts could be upheld is misplaced. Indeed, the Sable 
Court did distinguish Pacifica, and pointed out the differences between 
the broadcast and telephone mediums.249 However, it did not distin­
guish Pacifica and the broadcast industry to support the proposition 
that indecent broadcasts could be banned. Rather, it did so only to 
refute the FCC's argument that because Pacifica left unresolved the 
possibility of a total ban in broadcast,250 it left open the same possibil­
ity in the dial-a-porn industry. Therefore, nothing in the Sable deci­
sion supports the argument that a total ban on indecent broadcasts 
could be upheld. 
Furthermore, the FCC has always supported the position that a 
total ban on indecent broadcasts was an impermissible means to 
achieve the Government's compelling goa1. For example, before Con­
gress' imposition of a total ban, the FCC took the position that to 
totally prohibit the broadcast of indecent material would " 'run afoul 
of [the] constitutional premise' that the Commission 'may only do that 
which is necessary to restrict children's access to indecent broadcasts' 
and 'may not go further so as to preclude access by adults who are 
interested in seeing or hearing such materia1.' "251 As far back as 
Pacifica, the FCC recognized that a total ban on indecent speech was 
an improper goaPS2 It was the FCC's position at that time not to 
prohibit indecent broadcasts, but to channel them to times during 
which it was reasonable to conclude that there would not be children 
in the audience, and if there were, parents or other guardians would 
likely be available to supervise.253 Furthermore, a total ban on a pro­
tected area of speech is rarely, if ever, a constitutionally permissible 
249. Sable, 492 U.S. at 127-28. 
250. Id. The FCC argued that the Pacifica Court's holding that the FCC has power 
to regulate indecent broadcasts, left open the possibility that the FCC could also ban inde­
cent broadcasts in order to serve the compelling Government interest of protecting children 
from hearing indecent broadcasts if there was no other way to further that goal. 
251. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504, 1509 (D.C. Cir. 1991) 
("Act II") (quoting Reconsideration Order, 3 F.C.C.R. 930, 931 (1989», cert. denied, 112 
S. Ct. 1281-82 (1992). 
252. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 732-33 (1978). 
253. Id. (citing In re Petition For Clarification and Reconsideration of a Citizen's 
Complaint Against Pacifica Foundation, Station WBAI-(FM) New York, New York, 59 
F.C.C.2d 892 (1976». 
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means to accomplish the Government's compelling goals.254 
Thus, while the Act II court did not apply the correct constitu­
tional standard in reviewing the twenty-four hour ban on indecent 
broadcasts, it reached the proper result. This same result could have 
been reached by applying intermediate scrutiny as dictated by FCC v. 
League of Women Voters. 255 
C. 	 The Constitutionality of the 1989 Amendment: The Sable 
Standard as Applied in Information Providers' Coalition 
and Dial Information Services Corporation 
The Sable standard is, without question, the proper standard for 
the federal courts of appeals to apply in reviewing legislation aimed at 
the regulation of indecent dial-a-porn messages. However, the United 
States Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and Second Circuits in Infor­
mation Providers' Coalition 256 and Dial Information Services 257 ig­
nored, or at least undermined, the force of the "least restrictive 
means" language of the Sable standard and effectively applied a lower 
level of scrutiny258 in jUdging the constitutionality of title 47 section 
223(b) and (c) of the United States Code under the First Amendment. 
A better application of the Sable test by the Ninth and Second Circuit 
Courts of Appeals would have placed more emphasis on the "least 
254. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. Crime Victim Bd., 112 S. 
Ct. 501, 512-15 (1991).(Kennedy, J., concurring). In Justice Kennedy's concurring opin­
ion in Simon & Schuster, he argued that based on precedent and tradition "no inference 
can be permissibly drawn that the state may censor speech whenever it believes it has a 
compelling interest to do so." Id. at 513. 'Furthermore, Justice O'Connor, delivering the 
opinion of the Court, noted that "if there is a bedrock principle underlying the First 
Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit expression of an idea simply be­
cause society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable." Id. at 509 (quoting Texas v. 
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,414 (1989». 
255. 	 468 U.S. 364 (1984). 
256. Information Providers' Coalition for the Defense of the First Amendment v. 
FCC, 928 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1991). 
257. Dial Info. Servs. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 938 F.2d 1535 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. de­
nied, 112 S. Ct. 966 (1992). 
258. The difference between intermediate scrutiny and the higher level of scrutiny 
described in Sable lies within the requirement that the Government must use the "least 
restrictive means" to achieve a compelling goal. Under this heightened scrutiny, the Gov­
ernment is also required to show that the regulation is a narrowly and carefully tailored 
effort to achieve the Government's compelling interest. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 
U.S. 367 (1968). The intermediate scrutiny test is usually described in similar terms. How­
ever, under intermediate scrutiny the Government is required to show that there was a 
narrowly and carefully tailored effort to serve a substantial Government interest as opposed 
to a compelling one. Additionally, the Government need not choose the least restrictive 
means. Id. See also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 797-800 (1989), for a 
discussion of the differences between intermediate and strict'scrutiny. 
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restrictive means" language to ensure that the government regulations 
aimed at the content of protected speech were subject to the height­
ened scrutiny mandated by Sable. To ignore the requirement of 
choosing the "least restrictive means" in effect reduces the level of 
scrutiny to an intermediate level, which allows a reviewing court to 
choose between two possible means without regard to restrictiveness. 
Under strict scrutiny, there is only one choice--the least restrictive 
means. 
In Information Providers' Coalition and Dial Information Serv­
ices, the courts' analyses of the constitutionality of the Helms Amend­
ment were limited to the question of whether the statutory reverse 
blocking set forth in section 223(c), as opposed to voluntary or central 
office blocking, comported with the constitutional standard set forth in 
Sable. Both federal courts of appeals reached the same decision, spe­
cifically, that the reverse blocking or pre-subscription scheme set forth 
in section 223 comported with the standard set forth in Sable.2S9 
However, their respective analyses in reaching their respective conclu­
sions warrant separate treatment. 
1. 	 Information Providers' Coalition for Defense of the First 
Amendment v. FCC 
In Information Providers' Coalition, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the reverse blocking scheme 
and the FCC regulations under section 223 were narrowly tailored 
regulations that were necessary to promote a compelling government 
interest.260 However, the court also upheld the FCC's finding that 
voluntary blocking, as opposed to reverse blocking, was an ineffective 
means to achieve the goal of limiting minors' access to dial-a-porn 
services.261 In comparing the two methods of blocking, the court 
stated that "[voluntary blocking] even where effective, does not com­
pletely bar or totally impede" a minor from gaining access to dial-a­
porn.262 
In its opinion, the court did not discuss which of the two is the 
least restrictive means. Instead, it focused its analysis on which 
method is the most effective in limiting the number of children who 
might gain access to indecent telephone messages. Arguably, the test 
employed in Information Providers' Coalition was not the strict scru­
259. Information Providers' Coalition, 928 F.2d at 879; Dial Info. Servs. Corp., 938 
F.2d at 1541-43. 
260. Information Providers' Coalition, 928 F.2d at 879. 
261. Id. at 874. 
262. Id. at 873. 
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tiny standard set forth in Sable since the court's inquiry focused on the 
question of which method (voluntary or reverse blocking) was the 
more effective of the two without regard for which was the more re­
strictive. Since Sable mandates the application of strict scrutiny in 
reviewing dial-a-porn regulations, the court should have also consid­
ered what was the least restrictive means to further the compelling 
goal. 
A better, more speech-protective application of the Sable stan­
dard would factor into the analysis the question of which is the less 
restrictive of the two effective means. If one is only slightly less effec­
tive than the other, but significantly less restrictive, and both methods 
further the compelling goal, the balance should tip in favor of First 
Amendment rights of adults to have access to indecent speech.263 
263. Several commentators support the position that where there are two means to 
further the Government's goal and one is slightly less effective than the other, but substan­
tially less restrictive, the Government should be required to choose the less restrictive 
means in favor of protecting free expression under the First Amendment. See. e.g., John H. 
Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 
1340- 41 (1970). Professor Ely states, 
[Sometimes] the interest[s] in effective expression [are] so important that [the] 
government must on occasion accept less than entirely effective vindication of its 
expression .... The interests served by the draft card destruction law, like the 
interest in clean streets, can obviously be served by alternative means of regula­
tion. To note that they cannot be served as well by alternative means is not-as 
the Court seems to feel it is-the end of [the] analysis, but only the beginning. 
Id.; see also Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464, 466-69 
(1969) [hereinafter Less Drastic Means]. 
In Less Drastic Means, the author states that even when the Government interest is 
urgent, "it must do its balancing at the margin-that is, it must balance no more than the 
state's interest in the added effectiveness of the chosen means against the individual interest 
in the use of less drastic ones." Less Drastic Means, supra, at 467-68. The author further 
explains that the analysis cannot require the very least restrictive means be chosen since 
that would imply absolute protection. However, he explains that the Justices should use 
some process to estimate how much less effective one means is as compared to another and 
the effects of each upon non-First Amendment social values. According to the author, 
these factors should then be balanced against the accompanying gains and losses to the 
freedom of expression. Id. at 468; see also TRIBE, supra note 212, § 12-23, at 977-86. 
Professor Tribe suggests that in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), the 
Court should have insisted that the Government consider less restrictive alternatives that 
were almost as effective to prevent the Government from being able to show that the ban on 
draft card destruction was the least restrictive means capable of achieving its goal. Id.; see 
also MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH §§ 2.05(B)(4), 2.06(A)(4) 
(Rodney A. Smolla ed., 1984 & Supp. 1992). 
Professor Nimmer supports the use of a marginal gain versus marginal loss balancing 
test when employing the least restrictive means analysis in the context of the First Amend­
ment. He states that in applying the least restrictive means analysis the court should bal­
ance the interest in using a more restrictive means that is only marginally more effective 
against the importance of protecting free speech rights. Thus, Professor Nimmer would 
support the view that the marginally less effective means should be chosen by the Govern­
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Support for the view that the Government should be required to 
choose the least restrictive means to further the Government's goal 
even if the means are less effective than the alternate scheme proposed 
by the Government can be found in Lamont v. Postmaster General.264 
In Lamont, the Court struck down a federal statute that prevented 
individuals from receiving communist propaganda in the mail unless 
they notified the Post Office that they wanted the literature sent to 
their homes.26s Specifically, under the statute, the addressee, in order 
to receive this type of mail, was required to request in writing that it be 
delivered. The Court held that the statute violated the First Amend­
ment rights of those individuals who desired to receive the communist 
literature because it unnecessarily abridged their First Amendment 
freedoms by requiring them to take affirmative steps to receive this 
mail.266 
The Government's alleged goal in enacting the statute was to pro­
tect those individuals who might be offended by communist propa­
ganda from receiving it at their homes.267 However, the Court found 
that there was a regulation already in existence that protected the un­
willing recipient of communist propaganda. 268 The regulation pro­
vided that the Post Office must honor an individual's request to stop 
delivery of certain types of maiJ.269 Thus, Justice Brennan, in his 
concurring opinion, noted that although the statute at issue in the La
mont case would be a better way of achieving the Government's goal, 
the Government, in the area of First Amendment freedoms, has the 
"duty to confine itself to the least intrusive regulations which are ade­
quate for the purpose."270 Justice Brennan further stated that the 
First Amendment prevents the Government from enacting not only 
statutes that prohibit protected speech, but also those statutes which, 
like the one at issue in Lamont, inhibit an individual from exercising 
First Amendment rights.27\ 
The reverse blocking scheme upheld by the courts in Dial In/or­
ment unless using the more restrictive, more effective means is so important that it justifies 
the burden on the protected communication. 
264. 381 U.S. 301 (1965). 
265. Lamont, 381 U.S. at 302-03. 
266. [d. at 307. 
267. [d. at 309 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
268. Lamont, 381 U.S. at 310 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
269. [d. 
270. Id. 
271. [d. at 309. Justice Douglas, in the Opinion of the Court, also supports this 
conclusion. [d. at 307. 
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mation Services 272 and Information Providers' Coalition 273 is similar to 
the statutory scheme struck down by the Court in Lamont. Like the 
statutory requirement in Lamont that an individual who wants to re­
ceive communist propaganda in the mail must affirmatively request it 
in writing, so too must an individual request in writing to have his or 
her phone unblocked so as to gain access to dial-a-porn messages 
under the reverse blocking scheme. Voluntary blocking, on the other 
hand, does not require a willing customer to take the same kind of 
potentially embarrassing and stigmatizing step. Therefore, in order to 
ensure protection of an individual's First Amendment right of access 
to dial-a-porn, the slightly less restrictive means of voluntary blocking 
should be chosen, provided it is still an effective means even if not the 
most effective means available.274 This should be done especially if the 
difference in the level of effectiveness of each means is minimal. Under 
a voluntary blocking scheme, any comparative lack of effectiveness 
could be compensated for, not by the use of the stricter regulation of 
reverse blocking, but through encouragement of parental supervision 
and involvement. 
The argument made by the FCC in Information Providers' Coali­
tion that parents are not aware of voluntary blocking, and, therefore, 
will not request it, could be easily corrected by requiring a notice be 
included in each telephone bill making adults aware of the voluntary 
blocking option for indecent dial-a-porn. Arguably, not all people 
read notices enclosed in their telephone bills. Therefore, in addition to 
the notice, or as an alternative, a computerized message on the bill 
itself could effectively serve to make adults aware of the voluntary 
blocking option. By using this remedy, the many adults (with or with­
out children) who wish to have access to indecent dial-a-porn would 
not need to take the extra step required with reverse blocking of re­
questing in writirig that their phones be unblocked. Forcing adults 
who wish to have access to dial-a-porn to affirmatively request this 
service in writing inhibits individuals from exercising First Amend­
ment rights as recognized in Lamont.275 
One reason the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir­
cuit placed too much emphasis on the effectiveness of the regulations 
272. Dial Info. Servs. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 938 F.2d 1535 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. de­
nied, 112 S. Ct. 966 (1992). 
273. Information Providers' Coalition for Defense of the First Amendment v. FCC, 
928 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1991). 
274. See supra note 263. 
. 275. Lamont, 381 U.S. at 309 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also supra text accompa­
nying notes 263-71. 
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and not on their restrictiveness can be attributed to how the court 
perceived the relationship between the means chosen and the Govern­
ment's goal. The Information Providers' Coalition court, unlike the 
Sable Court, mistakenly assumed that the means chosen must be able 
to achieve the goal of "completely bar[ring] or totally imped[ing]"276 
children's access to dial-a-porn. Yet, the Sable Court. specifically 
noted that there may not be a fool-proof method of limiting children's 
access to dial-a-porn.277 Furthermore, since indecent speech has some 
protection under the First Amendment, a fool-proof method may not 
be a desirable goal. The Sable decision can also be read to mean that 
the compelling goal is to ensure that all but "the most enterprising and 
disobedient young people"278 are prohibited from gaining access to in­
decent dial-a-porn. With a scheme of voluntary blocking plus the ex­
isting FCC regulations, it is likely that only these children would gain 
access. 
2. Dial Information Services Corporation v. Thornburgh 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit also limited its re­
view of the restrictions embodied in the Helms Amendment to the 
requirement that the provider either engage in independent billing and 
collection or be subject to the telephone company requirement of re­
verse blocking or written pre-subscription.279 In applying the Sable 
standard to determine the constitutionality of reverse blocking as op­
posed to voluntary blocking, the court stated that in order for volun­
tary blocking proponents to prevail, "it must be determined that there 
are other approaches less restrictive than the Helms Amendment but 
just as effective in achieving its goal. "280 The court went on to find 
that even if voluntary blocking was the less restrictive means, it was 
not as effective as reverse blocking.281 
While voluntary blocking may not be the most effective means, 
the Sable test does not appear to require that it be the most effective 
means.282 Thus, the analysis should focus on both the effectiveness 
and the restrictiveness of the means chosen to further the compelling 
goal. Under Sable, regulations are required to be narrowly tailored so 
276. Information Providers' Coalition, 928 F.2d at 873. 
277. Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 130 (1989). 
278. Id. 
279. Dial Info. Servs. Corp. v. Thornburgh; 938 F.2d 1535, 1536-37 (2d Cir. 1991), 
cerro denied, 112 S. Ct. 966 (1992). 
280. Id. at 1541. 
281. Id. at 1542. 
282. See supra text accompanying notes 276-78. 
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as not to unnecessarily interfere with First Amendment freedoms. 283 
The two-tiered legislative scheme under section 223 which includes 
the reverse blocking requirement and the current FCC regulations un­
necessarily interferes with the First Amendment rights of adults 
wishing to hear indecent messages, when an alternative scheme of re­
placing reverse blocking with voluntary blocking would adequately 
serve the Government's compelling end. 
3. 	 The "Least Restrictive Means" Test Applied to the Entire 
Scheme Embodied in Section 223 
In both Information Providers' Coalition and Dial Information 
Services, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second and 
Ninth Circuits interpreted the Helms Amendment to mean that the 
statutory requirement of reverse blocking in section 223(c) and the 
FCC regulations promulgated under section 223(b )284 must both be 
complied with where technically feasible. 285 This construction is con­
sistent with the interpretation provided by the FCC. In its June 1990 
Report and Order on Regulations Concerning Indecent Telephone 
Communications, the FCC noted that blocking alone was an insuffi­
cient means to prevent children from gaining access to dial-a-porn.286 
Consequently, it concluded that section 223(b) (FCC regulations) and 
section 223(c) (statutory requirement) were not to be read in the alter­
native, but were to be read together.287 
Interestingly enough, although the FCC, Dial Information Serv­
ices court, and Information Providers' Coalition court all adopted an 
interpretation of section 223 that requires compliance with both the 
current FCC regulations and the statutory reverse blocking scheme, 
283. Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, l26 (1989). 
284. See supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text for the regulations under § 223. 
285. Dial Info. Servs. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 938 F.2d 1535, 1539 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. 
denied, 112 S. Ct. 966 (1992); Information Providers' Coalition for Defense of the First 
Amendment v. FCC, 928 F.2d 866, 871-72 (9th Cir. 1991). 
286. In re Regulations Concerning Indecent Communications by Telephone, 5 
F.C.C.R. 4926, 4931-33 (1990). 
287. Id. See supra notes 135-45 and accompanying text for the text of and discus­
sion of the statute and FCC regulations contained in § 223(b) and (c). Other commenta­
tors have suggested that a narrow interpretation of § 223 requiring compliance with only 
reverse blocking where feasible, and with only the FCC regulations where reverse blocking 
is not feasible, would best reflect the intention of Congress. Petersen, supra note 46, at 
2051-54. Petersen further suggested that under this interpretation, § 223 comports with 
the First Amendment because such a scheme would pass constitutional muster under the 
"least restrictive means test" announced in Sable. Id.; see also, Thomas J. Lo, The 
Supreme Court's Recent Stand on Dial-a-Porn Regulations: "Honey I Shrunk the First 
Amendment!." 19 W. STATE UNIV. L. REV. 431 (1992). 
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the question of whether section 223 as a whole was the least restrictive 
means was not at issue in either dial-a-porn case. The federal courts of 
appeals should have applied the "least restrictive means" test to the 
entire scheme embodied in section 223, not just the statutory portion 
in subsection (c), which sets forth the reverse blocking requirement. 
The effectiveness of voluntary versus reverse blocking should be mea­
sured in light of how effective each one is when operating in conjunc­
tion with the FCC regulations that are to be enforced concurrently. 
Voluntary blocking coupled with the FCC regulations is not only ef­
fective, but is substantially less restrictive than the current scheme 
which requires reverse blocking in addition to compliance with the 
other statutory requirements and FCC regulations. If the Dial Infor­
mation Services court had considered voluntary blocking and the FCC 
regulations as a whole, it may have found that voluntary blocking was 
sufficiently effective.288 A regulatory scheme consisting of voluntary 
blocking plus the current FCC regulations, would likely pass constitu­
tional muster under the First Amendment standard set forth in Sable 
since it is an effective and narrowly tailored means of achieving the 
goal of preventing children from gaining access to dial-a-porn 
messages. 
CONCLUSION 
The federal courts of appeals' applications of the Sable test have 
left many unanswered questions with respect to what level of scrutiny 
should be applied in the broadcast medium as compared to the dial-a­
porn medium. The Supreme Court has denied certiorari in Act II.289 
In Act II, the court applied strict scrutiny relying on Sable, even 
though Sable involved dial-a-porn phone messages rather than broad­
cast. In doing so, the Act II court ignored the precedent set forth in 
FCC v. League of Women Voters 290 which adopted an intermediate 
scrutiny standard in reviewing broadcast regulations. The Act II 
court should have applied intermediate scrutiny in reviewing the 
twenty-four hour ban on indecent broadcasts and struck the ban down 
as unconstitutional based on that analysis rather than under strict 
scrutiny. 
Additionally, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Ninth 
288. See supra notes 160-76, 199-206 and accompanying text for discussion of the 
Information Providers' Coalition and Dial Info. Servs. Corp. courts' rejection of voluntary 
blocking. 
289. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("Act 
II"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1281-82 (1992). 
290. 468 U.S. 364 (1984). 
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and Second Circuits' decisions in the dial-a-porn context indicate that 
there is some confusion as to how to apply the Sable standard to regu­
lations aimed at indecent telephone messages. While the language of 
the Sable decision is indicative of a strict scrutiny standard, the Ninth 
and Second Circuit Courts of Appeals appear to have applied a lower 
level of scrutiny in reviewing the constitutionality of the Helms 
Amendment. 
Based on the standard set forth in Sable, strict scrutiny should 
have been applied in reviewing the dial-a-porn regulations in Dial In­
formation Services and Information Providers' Coalition. Under strict 
scrutiny, the reverse blocking requirement of the Helms Amendment 
could not pass constitutional muster under the First Amendment. 
Given the existence of the less restrictive means of voluntary blocking 
to achieve the Government's compelling goal of protecting children 
from gaining exposure to indecent speech over the telephone, reverse 
blocking is not the least restrictive alternative. The Dial Information 
Services court and the Information Providers' Coalition court should 
have read the Sable standard as requiring the least restrictive means to 
prevail even if it is a slightly less effective means. . 
Finally, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and 
Second Circuits should have evaluated the constitutionality of section 
223 as a whole. If the courts had done this they would have found 
that a statutory voluntary blocking scheme coupled with the current 
FCC regulations was an extremely effective means to further the Gov­
ernment's goal of preventing minors from gaining access to indecent 
dial-a-porn messages. 
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